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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO ACTION
Petitioners/Appellants.

Mast Construction Company was

the Defendant below in C-85-1607, C-85-3067, C-85-4885.

Mast

Construction was substituted for Debenham Electric Supply Co. on
December 16, 1986.
Ron Mast:

R-III-1179 to 1185.
Ron Mast was substituted

for Intermountain

Glass and Paint Co. and Marathon Steel Co. on December 16, 1986.
Id.

Masts appear as mechanic lienholders at their own right and

also as assignees of various other mechanics' lienholders.
Construction

Company

and

Ron

Mast

will

usually

be

Mast
known

hereinafter as "Masts".
Respondent.

American

Savings

&

Loan

Association

("American Savings"), was the Plaintiff below in C-85-4885.
Other parties. Electro Technical Corporation
Tech") was

the Defendant

below

in C-85-1607

and

("Electro
C-85-4885.

Electro Tech did not appeal.
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc. ("Edwards & Daniels"):
Defendant below in C-85-4885.

Edwards & Daniels filed a Notice

of Appeal on December 16, 1986.

That appeal, No. 860669, was

dismissed by the Supreme Court of Utah on June 8, 1987 due to
Edwards & Daniels1 failure to prosecute the appeal.
Masts are unaware of any other party having petitioned
this Court for a writ of certiorari.
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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Is a "Trust Deed" omitting the amount of the loan, name

of the trustee and terms of the secured loan enforceable as a
legal mortgage as against third party mechanics1 lien holders?
II.

Is the court's finding that the Trust Deed was signed

in the presence of the notary against the great weight of the
evidence?
III.
later

Is a deed signed outside the presence of a notary but

"notarized" an acknowledged

document, capable of being

recorded?

REPORTS OF OPINIONS
Original affirmance of trial court.
Constr. Co.f

General Glass Corp. v. Mast

758 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Opinion withdrawn on rehearing.
Constr. Co.,

General Glass Corp. v. Mast

91 Utah Adv. Rep. 15,

P. 2d

(Utah Ct. App.

1988).
New opinion, on rehearing, from which this petition is taken.
General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.,
P.2d

98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53,

(Utah Ct. App. December 15, 1988).

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Petition seeks review of the December 15, 1989 decision
on

rehearing

of

the

Utah

Court
- 1 -

of

Appeals.

The

original

decision

was entered

June

1 0 , 1988, withdrawn September 13,

1988/ and a new opinion decision affirming on different grounds
was entered December 15/ 1988.
On January 17/ 1989 Justice Richard C. Howe granted an Order
Extending Time to Petition for Certiorari through and including
February 2, 1989.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Rules 45 and 46/ R.
Utah S. Ct.f and 78-2-2(5)/ Utah Code Annotated (1988).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The full text of the following code sections is included in
the Appendix.
38-1-1 to 26/ Utah Code Annotated (1974)
38-1-5/ Utah Code Annotated (1953)
38-1-10/ Utah Code Annotated (1953)
38-1-26/ Utah Code Annotated (1953) 57-1-6/ Utah Code Annotated
(1986)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent American Savings and Loan Association ("American
Savings") brought this action seeking to recover sums due on
construction loans by foreclosing an alleged trust deed covering
real property located

in Salt Lake County, claiming priority

over the mechanics1 liens of Petitioners

(Masts).

Actions by

various mechanics' lien holders were consolidated with American
- 2 -

Savings' lawsuit.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered in

favor of American Savings and against Masts in that consolidated
actionf

upholding

the

acknowledgment

and

form

of

American

Savings1

trust deed and the priority of its trust deed over

Masts' mechanics' liens.
This is a Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court
of Appealsf which affirmed the decisions on summary judgment and
after

trial

of the Third District

Court, Salt Lake County,

Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding.

A.

Parties.

Mast

Construction

Electric

Supply

Company

Company

and

was
Ron

substituted
Mast

was

for

Debenham

substituted

for

Intermountain Glass and Paint, Inc., and Marathon Steel Company.
(R-II-118)(R-III-1182).

For

all practical

purposes

in this

petitionf American Savings is the Respondent in this matter, and
Ron Mast and Mast Construction Company are the Petitioners.

B.

References.

This matter consists of three (3) volumes of Record and six
(6) volumes of Transcript and Judge's Ruling.
record will be made by (R) .

Reference to the

Reference to the Transcript and

Judge's Ruling will be made by (T) with a hyphen then a Roman
Numeral
indicate

(I, II, III, IV, V or VI) and then a page number to
the appropriate

page and volume
- 3 -

of the record, or

transcript and judge's ruling.

For clarityf the date of the

transcript will sometimes be used,

C.

Procedural History.

In a pre-trial summary judgment hearing Judge Hanson held
that American Savings' trust deed is effective even though it
was incomplete when recordedf and subsequently twice amended and
re-recorded. (T-I-3), (T-I-4) &

(T-I-9).

this ruling was signed on June 19/ 1986.

The Order reflecting
See (R-II-764 to 765),

where Judge Hanson concisely states the issues of fact and law
which remained for trial.
At the conclusion of a two day court trial, Judge Hanson
held that American Savings' trust deed was regular on its face
and conforms to the format prescribed by statute (T-VI-21); that
said trust deed was "executed completed/ delivered and recorded
in conformance with the intent of the parties."

(R-III-1Q14

114) ; that at the time the trust deed was signed the persons
signing the trust deed were not placed under oath (R-III-1-14
113) and did not otherwise acknowledge their signatures to the
notary; and that the deed was signed in the presence of the
notary.
Judge

Id.
Hanson

held

therefor

that the notarization of the

trust deed was a valid acknowledgment/
entitled to be recorded/ and

the trust deed was

adequately imparted notice from

April 8/ 1983/ the date of its first
- 4 -

recordation

(T-VI-21)/

(T-VI-28),

(T-VI-29) & (R-III-1014 to 1015).

The court also

found that work did not begin on the site prior to April 8/
1983.

(T-VI-25 to 26) & (R-III-1014 to 1015 13), (T-IV-1648).

Masts
motions

and

various

objecting

to

other
the

mechanics1
Proposed

lien

Findings

holders
of

filed

Fact

and

Conclusions of Lawf moved for a new trial/ and to amend the
judgment

(R-II-831) ,

(R-III-988),

(R-II-845),

(R-III-1006) .

The

(R-II-870),
court

denied

(R-III-985),
the

motions,

entering its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on August
27, 1986

(R-III-1G12) .

Masts filed a Motion for Rule 54(b)

Certification Re Judgment on Priority Issues, heard October 6,
1986.

In an Order for Entry of Final Judgment dated November

18, 1986 R-III-1175) the district court held that the Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law were a final determination of the
lien priority issues; that said issues would be appealable but
for other issues remaining to be decided in the case; that there
was no just reason for delaying the appeal of the lien priority
claims; and that pursuant to Rule 54(b) URCP there existed no
just reason for delaying the entry of final judgment on the
claims of lien priority.
The Court of Appeals in its first decision found that Ron
Mast, one of the petitioners, had actual notice of the lien and
that

such

notice

automatically

caused

all

the

petitioners to be subordinate to the deed of trust.

liens

of

General

Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 758 P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App.
- 5 -

1988)(copy in appendix).
Masts petitioned
Court

of

Appeals

had

for

rehearing

misapprehended

on the basis that the
law

and

facts.

Masts

pointed out that they were holders of various mechanics1 liens,
directly and as assignees, and that if actual notice had been
fatal it would have affected the rights of other lien holders
and the liens assigned to Masts after the occurrence of all
operative facts in this case.

Masts also argued that the effect

of the Court of Appeals ruling was to emasculate the mechanics1
lien statutes and would have serious effects on the economy.
The decision had mistakenly found that if a party had actual
notice there would eventually be a construction loan the court
would

not need

to determine whether work commenced

before a

proper recording of the lender's deed of trust.
The

Court

of

Appeals

granted

Masts'

petition

for

rehearing and withdrew its decision by order dated September 13,
1988.

General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 91 Utah Adv.

Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
On December
opinion

on

15, 1988 the Court of Appeals entered its

rehearing,

different grounds.
(copy in appendix) .

affirming

the trial Court decision on

98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
The court found the document was not a

valid trust deed but was a valid mortgage.
On January 17, 1989 the Court granted Masts' ex parte
motion for an extension of time to petition the Court for a Writ
of Certiorari, allowing through and including
- 6 -

to February 2,

1989 to file the petition (copy in appendix).

D.

Relevant Pacts

On March 28, 1983 American Savings loaned $10.4 million to
Oakhills, a Utah
construction*

limited

Exhibit P-l

partnership, to finance

condominium

(included in Appendix).

A note for

that amount was signed by Oakhills, and American Savings and
Oakhills executed a document titled "Multifamily Deed of Trust,
Assignment of Rents and Security Agreement."
P-4.

The

circumstances

and

questionable

Exhibits P-l and
validity

of

the

execution and subsequent recording of that document give rise to
the appeal, which in turn gives rise to this Petition.

The "Deed

of Trust" will be referred to herein as Trust Deed, although its
validity as such is not admitted.
The Trust Deed was executed by Charles Akerlow and Richard
Anderson, officers of the general partner of Oakhills.
P-l.

Exhibit

When they signed the document, the amount of the loan, the

date and description of the loan and the identity of the Trustee
were left blank.

Exhibit P-l; Brief of Respondent, p. 5.

blanks were filled in sometime after recordation.

Some

The deed was

prepared by a title company, agent for American Savings.
The acknowledgment was filled in by Jeffrey Jensen, a notary
public and officer of the title company.
Anderson nor Akerlow took an oath.
001014.

T-IV-3 to 6.

Neither

Finding of Fact # 3 .

R.

The notary stated in the acknowledgment, however, that
- 7 -

the two were "sworn by me. . . ."

Exhibit P-l at p. 8.

The

court below also found they signed in the presence of the notary.
Id. # 1; R. 001013.

Masts believe this finding was against the

great weight of the evidence.
In addition to the acknowledgement's statement that Akerlow
and

Anderson

"appeared

before

me",

the

only

other

evidence

petitioner has been able to marshal on point is as follows:
—Akerlow,
testified

he

called
and

as

a

Anderson

witness

signed

for

the trust

American
deed

Savings,

in his own

office, that no one else was present, and that the notary had
never even been to his office.
the closing.

He denied having even attended

T-II-1380 (Pages 74 through 81 and 95 through 96 of

the June 1986 proceedings are attached in the Appendix for the
Court's

convenience).

Judge

Hanson

disbelieved

Akerlow.

T-8-11-86 p. 8.
—Akerlow

signed an affidavit to the same effect/ but at a

deposition stated he could not at that time recall whether he
appeared before the notary.

T-II-1383.

Akerlow's explanation

for his clearer memory at trial than at the earlier deposition
was the realization the notary, whom he knew well,
been to his office.

had never

He stated he was sure both men signed in his

office, and therefor had recalled clearly that the notary could
not have witnessed the signatures.
—Stephen
American

Emrick, who

Savings,

T-ll-1386.

attended

testified

that

- 8 -

the

closing

Anderson

and

on behalf
Akerlow

of

were

present, and that the notary was "there for time periods"/ and
was "in and out" of the room.

T-II-1340 to 1342.

He could not

recall any details of the execution of the note and trust deed.
Id.

He testified Mr. Stermer of American Savings attended the

closing with him.
party.

Stermer was not called as a witness by any

Emrick has attended about 50 closings involving over a

million dollars each.
hours.

He did say the closing lasted about two

T-6-25-86 p. 61.

part of the time.

He also testified Ron Mast was present

T-12-1340 to 1342.

—Ron Mast testified he has never been to Western Title, the
site of the closing/ and had never met Mr. Emrick before trial.
T-6-25-86 p. 126.
—Anderson, the other signatory/ testified that hef Jensenf
Akerlow and Emrick were present at the closing/ which he said
lasted most of the day.

Anderson Depo. at 15-16.

mention Ron Mast being present.

He did not

He could not recall whether

Jensen was in the room when the trust deed was signed.

Anderson

Depo. at 12/ 15-17/ 20.
—Jensen/ the notary public/ could not recall Akerlow's and
Anderson's execution of the trust deed/ T-VI-7/ 8/ 14, although
he was well acquainted with both signatories.

In fact/ asked if

he recalled "any of the circumstances of that closing" he said/
"I

have

vague

recollection

of

Mr.

Emerick's

name,

and

his

involvement being in townf discussing some documents with himf
but not a direct recollection of the closing ceremony, if there
- 9 -

one was itself (sic)."
continued/

Partial Transcript of 6-25-86, p. 4.

He

"I don't have a direct recollection of seeing loan

documents signed, no."
he was present or not.

Id.

He did not recall at trial whether

Id. at 6.

When American Savings' counsel

asked Jensen whether he had a custom or practice, he said:
Yes.
In by far the majority of cases — in all cases
where it is possible, I am present when the people are
signing documents. There are occasions when I may be
out of the room getting a copy. I may be discussing
something with someone out of the room. . . .
Id. at 8.

He also stated, "If I know that person, and I witness

him signing documents, I don't check to see that he has signed
every one while I'm present in the room."

Id.

On the date of the closing Jensen's Daytimer contained an
entry "Akerlow, Thomas, Dyer."
Akerlow's group by."

He explained, "that's what I know

Id. at 10.

Jensen stated that since he was acquainted with Akerlow and
knew his signature, he would have less hesitation to notarize his
signature.

Id. at 11.

It is undisputed

that work was commenced

at the property

sometime in April or May, although Judge Hanson found it did not
commence before the April 8, 1983 recording date.
Fact # 6 T-001014.

The Court of Appeals upheld that finding.

General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.,
P.2d

Finding of

(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

- 10 -

98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53,

ARGUMENT
INTRODUCTION
The desirability of granting this Petition is underlined
by the recent decision of this Court in Mickelsen v. Craigcoy
Inc., 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 21;
1989) .

P.2d

(Utah January 11,

In that case the Court appears to have resolved, at

least under the facts of that case, the question of whether an
acknowledgment may suffice without an oral oath.

However, it

points out the area of law is still unclear, and seems to affirm
the requirement that the affiant appear personally before the
notary.

I.

Is a "Trust Deed" omitting the amount of the loan,

name of the trustee and terms of the secured loan enforceable as
a legal mortgage as against third party mechanics1 lien holders?
The trust deed

at

issue

recited

it was between the

"Trustor/Grantor" Oakhills,

"(herein

trustee)", and the "Beneficiary", State Savings
Savings) referred to as

"Lender".

(now American

Exhibit P-l.

The next paragraph states that Borrower, in consideration
of

the

"indebtedness

herein

recited

and

the

trust

herein

created" grants, conveys and assigns to Trustee, with power of
sale, "[the leasehold estate pursuant to a lease (herein 'ground
lease1) dated

between
- 11 -

and
recorded in
in

and

to]"

description

(sic)

the

which was

property

attached

contained

in

the

legal

as an exhibit, together with

personal property listed.
To Secure to Lender (a) the repayment of the
indebtedness evidenced by Borrower's note dated
(herein note) in the principal sum of
Dollars, with interest
thereon, with the balance of the indebtedness, if
not sooner paid, due and payable on
_ ^ ^ _ and . . . the performance of the covenants
and
agreements
of
Borrower
contained
in a
Construction Loan Agreement between Lender and
Borrower dated
, 19 . . . .
In each example above the blanks left are as they appeared in
the original as recorded.

Exhibit P-l.

Nowhere is the amount

of the debt or the identity of the trustee contained in the
instrument.

And the terms of the loan are also absent from

this, the only document recorded.
The Court

of Appeals

began

its analysis by correctly

pointing out the distinction between a mortgage and a trust deed
in a "lien theory" state like Utah.

General Glass Corp. v. Mast

Constr. Co., 98 Utah Adv. Rep. 53, 55.

The court found the

document could not serve as a valid trust deed since it does not
identify the trustee to whom it purports to convey title.
However,

the

court

went

on

to

agree

with

the

Id.
trial

court's alternative conclusion that the instrument recorded is
operative as a mortgage despite the omissions.
believe was in error.
- 12 -

Id.

This Masts

As the Court of appeals itself states/ a mortgage is not
a title-conveying instrument.
462/

189 P.2d

118

(1948).

Id.; Bybee v. Stewart/ 112 Utah
The instrument

at issue clearly

intends to convey title in trust to a trustee.
is merely and expressly the beneficiary.

American Savings

If title is conveyed

to an unidentified person/ surely no interest is conveyed.

The

Court of Appeals has taken the mistake of American Savings/ and
tried to remedy it by calling it something else.

This would

require the Court to ignore the language which is contained in
the deed.
As

indicated

by

the

abovef

as written

and

with

the

omissions much of the deed is nonsensically vague.
While the provisions of § 57-1-14
suggestion

of

what

a

land

mortgage

(1986) are merely a

might

contain/

Utah's

legislature must have included it to indicate some formality and
some inclusion of basic terms is necessary.
deviation

containing

almost

none

of

the

Surely a gross

suggested

elements

cannot pass for a legal mortgage/ except perhaps between the
parties.

Here the Court of Appeals1 interpretation closes out

innocent mechanics1 lien holders in favor of the draftsman of
the defective instrument.
w

[T]he mechanic's lien law was enacted for the benefit of

those who perform the labor and supply the materials and . . .
the lien claimant's remedy should not be limited without a clear
mandate

from

the

legislature
- 13 -

requiring

such

an

effect."

Mickelsen v. Craigco, Inc., 99 Utah Adv. Rep. 21;
(Utah Jan. 11 1989) .
legislative

intent

P.2d

In Mickelsen this Court found no clear

to support

its cutting off of these lien

To protect mechanics1 lien holders, the courts should

holders.

construe the statute creating mechanics1 liens broadly.
v. Call, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 12
1989) .

Bailey

(Utah Ct. App. Jan. 12,

The Court of Appeals did not have the benefit of either

Mickelsen or Bailey in rendering its decision.
The

Court

parties, but

of

Appeals

to the wrong

looks
end.

to

the

intention

of

the

98 Utah Adv. Rep. at 55.

Indeed, the intent of the parties controls in deciding whether a
document is a mortgage.
378 P.2d

355, 357

Hallstrom v. Buhler, 14 U.2d 111, 114;

(1963).

create a security agreement.
property in trust.

Here the intent was not just to
The obvious intent was to deed the

The lender having failed to accomplish this,

no effective transaction was consumated.

No particular form may

be required for the mortgage, but the intent of the parties must
be shown.

Bybee v. Stewart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948).

Here it is not.
The Summary of Utah Real Property Law, BYU (197 8) Vol. I
§ 9.55 recommends a mortgage might contain consideration (which
this does not), description of property, habendum clause, the
covenants, due on encumbrance

clause, charges, insurance and

taxes, and the mortgagee's right to possession.

- 14 -

Purported mortgages are construed strictly against the
party

responsible

for

the drafting

(here American

Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242 (1931).

Savings).

Here lack of

a trustee is similar to lack of a payee, which would render a
mortgage invalid.

Summary of Utah Real Property Law, BYU (1978)

Vol. I § 9.69, 9.72.

Courts will not torture the meaning of a

document to make construe it as a mortgage.

Pearce v. Shurtz, 2

U.2d 124, 270 P.2d 442, 444 (Utah 1954).

II.

Is the court's finding that the Trust Deed was

signed in the presence of the notary against the great weight of
the evidence?
The Court of Appeals rejected Masts' argument that the
deed was invalid because it was signed outside the presence of
the notary, saying Mast failed to marshal the evidence and show
the court's finding to the contrary was erroneous.
may be overturned
evidence.

The finding

if it is against the great weight of the

Bailey v. Call, 100 Utah Adv. Rep. 11 (Utah Ct. App.

Jan. 13, 1989 (dealing with mechanics' liens), quoting Utah R.
Civ. P. 52(a).

Mast believes it did marshal the evidence in its

briefs before the Court of Appeals (see, e.g., App. Brief pp. 6,
7, 13, 14, 15, 26), but, sensitive to the criticism, this is
done in the foregoing summary of facts.
In sum, of five possible witnesses, one did not testify,
one said no notary was present, and two, including the notary,
did not recall.
- 15 -

The burden of proof is always upon the party who seeks to
establish a fact.

The burden of proving the validity of the

notarization is, and always has been upon upon American Savings.
Utah

Rule

of

Evidence

301

deals with presumptions

substantially identical Federal Rule of Evidence 301.

and

is

FRE 301

states that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof or
the burden

of persuasion

on an

issue.

The burden always

remains upon the party on whom it was originally cast.

12 Fed.

Proc. L. Ed., §§33:67, 33: 69.
Respondents are aided in this burden by the presumption
that notaries have properly

carried

our

the duties of their

office, including the acknowledgment of documents.
Finance

Co.

Inc.,

v.

Carney,

However, a presumption

is not

605

P.2d

509

evidence, and

Farm Bureau

(Idaho
it

1980).

disappears

entirely upon the introduction of any contradicting evidence.
When

such

evidence

presumed fact is

is

introduced

the

truthfulness

of

the

determined exactly as if no presumption had

existed.

Bank of Washington v. Hilltop Shakemill, Inc., 614

P.2d 1319

(Wash. App. 1980); Sheehan v. Pima County, 680 P.2d

486 (Ariz. App. 1982) .
Here the presumption that the notarial acts were validly
accomplished
contrary,

was

defeated

shifting

the

by

burden

evidence
to

and

testimony

Respondents.

to the
This

is

especially true in light of the fact the acknowledgment perjures
itself, stating falsely that the signatories were sworn under
- 16 -

oath.

This falsity is undisputed.

In the Farm Bureau case,

since there was sufficient evidence to find that acknowledgment
was

false

and

not

merely

incomplete/

the

presumption

regularity in performance of notarial acts was overcome.

of
Farm

Bureau Finance Co. Inc., v. Carney, 605 P.2d 509 (Idaho 1980).
See also 12 Fed. Proc. L. Ed., §33:68.
The presumed regularity of notarizations is overcome by
evidence that the notary failed to require that the trust deed
be signed in his presence and failed
affirmation.

to require an oath or

See Farm Bureau Finance Co. Inc., v. Carney, 605

P.2d 509 (Idaho 1980) .
Respondents have failed to prove

the trust deed was

properly acknowledged, despite their burden to do so.

12 Fed.

Proc. L. Ed., §33:69.

III.

Is a deed signed outside the presence of a notary

but later "notarized" an acknowledged document, capable of being
recorded?
The Mickelsen case, supra, found that no oral oath was
necessary, so long as an oath was provided in the language to
which the signatories signed their names.
22.

99 Utah Adv. Rep. at

In this case there was not such a "correct written oath or

affirmation."

Exhibit P-l pp. 7-8.

So even under Mickelsen the

failure to require an oath—oral or written—may invalidate the
deed as against a third party mechanic's lien holder.
- 17 -

And Mickelsen pointed out that "it must be signed in the
presence of a notary or other person authorized to take oaths"/
which it was not.

Id. (emphasis added).

That case expressly did not upset Helsten v. Schwendimany
668

P.2d

509

(Utah 1986)/

requiring

personally in front of the notary.

the

affiant

to appear

Id. at 22.

CONCLUSION
The deed as written is so incomplete as to be vague, and
does not impart notice to third parties or rise to the level of
a valid mortgage.

Norf as the Court of Appeals concluded/ can

it be a trust deed.
Finding the deed was signed in the presence of the notary
is against the great weight of the evidence.
did not actually

see the singing/

Because the notary

and because there was no

actual oath/ written or spokenf the deed could not be validly
recorded and may not prevail over the liens of these mechanics
and materialmen.

RELIEF REQUESTED
Petitioner

requests a Writ

of Certiorari to the Utah

Court of Appeals, and reversal of that court's decision.
Respectfully

so petitioned the second day of February/

1989.

Mitchell R. Barker
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I mailed or hand delivered four
copies

of the foregoing to the following persons on the sixth

day of February/ 1989, and that I lodged a copy with the Clerk
of the Court on the second day of February, 1989.
VANCOTT/ BAGLEY/ CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
David Black
B. Stephen Marshall
Edwards & Daniels
50 S. Main #1600
Salt Lake Cityr Utah 84144
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
Warren Patten
W. Cullen Battle
Attorneys for Respondent
American Savings & Loan Assoc.
215 S. State/ #1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Mitchell R. Barker
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APPENDIX I

TRUST DEED AS ORIGINALLY RECORDED

EXHIBIT P-1

WHIN U O O W D MAIL TO

State Sawing and lorn kmadMlm
y»3 Ea*t mn Stxvet
Stockton, Cfclif.
95202

3775692

SPACE ABOVE THIS UNE FOt tECOIDCft? USE

MULTIFAMILY DEED OF TRUST,
ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS AND SECURITY AGREEMENT
(Security for Coastrwctloa LMI Afreraeat)
THIS DEED OF TRUST (Herein -fnaimmenr) if made ffus
28th
^ y of
K|rch
19 £3..., among the Truator/Grantor. .OAKHIILS..PAItni£RSHIP^A.ilUh..Li«lUd Jfcrtaerxiup
«4UMKaddreu a C/Av£jrti!l& J l ^ ^
(herein -Sorrower^)
_
the •enefiaary. iTAIL.5AVINfiS..AMa.<LQnii..ASSOClAIIOI1
a

...corporation

ty.
-~~

Ut*fe.~*Uai
(herein -Trustee"), and

organized and earning under the law* of ...the. -StAttJOf..XiliforalA

•lute address * .143..Ust.toin..Street^..Stocktoa9..UUfontU.^BS20l
(herein -Lender").
•otnowER. in consideration of the indebtedness herein recited and the trust herein created, irrevocably trams,
conveys and assigns to Trustee, in trust, wnh power of sale, (the leasehold estate pursuant to a lease (herein "ground
lease") dated
«
between
and
„_..
.
thf...Cfluntv. Of ,S*U.l*k€ ....

m and to* | the following described property located in
_ State of Utah:

See Exhibit *A"f attached hereto and Incorporated herein by
reference.

Tocmttft with all buildings, improve menu and tenements now or hereafter erected on the property, and ail
heretofore or hercarter vacated alley* And street* abutting toe property, and all easements,rights,appunenancei. rents
(subject however to the assignment of rent* to Lender herein |, royalties, mineral, od and gat rights and profits, water,
water nghtv and water stock appurtcnani to the property, and all natures, machinery, equipment, engine*, hotter*,
incinerators, huilding material*, appliance* and good* of every nature whjiMtever mm or hereafser looted in. or on.
or uted. or intended to he used in connection with the pmpeny. including, hut not limned 10. those for the purposes of
supplying or distributing heating, outing, electricity, gat. water, air and light: and all elevators. and related machinery
and equipment, lire prevention and eiunguithtng apparatus, security and access control apparatus, plumbing, hath
tubs, water heaters, water closet*, sinks, ranges, stoves, refrigerator*, dishwasher*. dt*po*al*. washers, dryers, awnings,
storm windows, storm doors, screens. Mind*. *hades. curiam* and curiam rod*, minors, cam nets, panelling, nigs,
attached floor covering*, furniture, picture*, antenna*, tree* and plantv and
~
.
^ all of whsvh. including replacements and additsou* thereto, shall he deemed
to he and remain a pan %%(the real pmpeny covered hy thi* Instrument: and all of theforegoing,together with said
property (or the leasehold estate in the event this Instrument is om a leasehold I art herein referred so as the
-Property"*
To Sfrtat TO U M O M I <a| the repayment of the indebtedness evidenced hy Borrower'* note dated
(herein "Note") in the principal sum of.
—.
.
-..
Dollar*.
•nth mierest thereon, with the balance of the indebtedness, if not sooner paid, due and payable on
and all renewal*, eitensions and mudihcauoos thereof: (b»the repayment
of any future advance*, with inirmu thereon, made hy Lender so Borrower pursuant to paragraph 31 hereof (hereto
"Future Advance***): (c) the performance of the covenant jud agreements of Borrower contained in a Construction
Loan Agreement between Lender and Borrower dated
'*
ifnoy. as provided in
paragraph 25 hereof. < d | the payment of all other sums. isrth interest thereon, advanced m accordance herewith to
protect the security of this Instrument; and (e )the performance nf the covenants and agree menu of Borrower heron
contained
Borrower covenant* that Borrower is lawfully seised of the estate hereby conveyed mmd km the right to grant,
convey and as*ign the Pmpeny I And, if this instrument t* on a leasehold, that the ground lease « in full fere* and
effect without uuidiacation eicem at noted above and without default am the pan of either lessor or leaaae
thereunder |. that the Pmpeny is unencumbered, and that Borrower wdl warrant and defend generally the wit to the
Properly against all claim* and demand, subject to any easements and restneuons nued in a schedule ofeiripuuu* to
coverage m any nth? insurance poucy msunng Lender *s interest m the Pioperty.
_

Ufltfm C M M M H .

Bofiwm md U a f e r CDWMMN aa* t f t w «

falling.

t. fAVMtMT Of MIINCIF4L AMD PfTlinVT. laeanm a a f * M ^ pay *a*a aw * » awwawd at aa* « «
W * M i d hy the *aw. aay pnpayaia nod aw cnncpr* praiaad a a * Mat aw* at aw* • asm anawad p» aw> tema
1 f l W m r O t T A t l A f N 1 « l J t 4 i a r i A M O O T M f « O I 4 K a . I a * a n » « f a * n * t » W a r « • • « * » « « » * ay I
pay a Leader en rht day awawhty awanW**, of pfwanju) or awnaw mm paytai motor 0W haw tot aa onaawr day at
r1. uoul the Mow n pad a full, a ova (herein "FuodO oaoaJ a aw to lira of u > dw
• winch may he i w ^ M w t Ptupiny. I of the year^ gauaod man* o*aay. Ic» aw yearly •
H aWUMMMMft M* mortgage IMOMnCt. if any. OMJ <«) O* IM b B M M • Ml • I
l e a * . aU m » i w i w > ewimawd owoaMy * M J f r n a a n * M» aaw ay L-endet aa aw aaa> of a
Any « « m by Lender of a I H W I M M that Barron «i pay awa FawH May a t arvaaed ay Lender, a Lender'« taw daawwaa. at aay i
aaact M wtuang •» aWiOM«i Lender May mooter Buriaact a pay a Leader, M advance, oar* onwr F a w n Car other w a n . cunrfev |

The Fund* ifcall or htfcJ M ao teawwutusnui rat ttaom> or a w a u a * wt amah aaw a w a r d of g i n i n i i i by a Federal or aww i p i a i j
(awiiiding Lender if Leader » swh aa lOMautmo I Lender thai! apary rat Fuaan w pay taw raan. araa>. uuwv • i m i i a i i n i i
• MVOMM
aad Other ImmtsMMM *» long a» Borrower n am M breach of aay M M aaw « a f m a w M of l u i m a n » on* l o a m n m
Lcojler than1 a n t e aa
charge far sn holding and applying the Fundt. analywng u d account or far uteWyag aad M o p i n g ant* l o m o i i u aad bdh. uahm Leader pay*
•arrawtr a w n n t . earnmgt «w pr«*ts no the Funds aad appiicaow l&m mrmm Ltmmrr w OMAC toed a d u r p t a w i o o n aad Leader awy a p n * m
vnung 4* tar ttote of f w v w u w <*f eon lourooirai toat lowit u oa lor Food* «o«l! a t paM] to l o n w r t . aad) o o V u loco a f i — M t M m OMMW or
oppocaMt l a « fra.oar» M w m i . tarawff>.» | M H M , M> a t paat. Lradtf «*oM aa* a t wdMWd %j a«y i w w i o < i aay o w r v u . rarotof* or paaott oa aw
Fwadi Leader khall gave to •rwrrmrf wolniot i-h»ft. aa aa*aal ioBDiaua| of tor Foodb M Leader * aanaai <ono«» M O T M * credm aad dearn to
t F«ad» aad tat porpux for w o * * eatrA deoa in tar FoaoH « M awde Tar FwaaH are pwa:p^ a» adoMamai « * w w y M T aw M M owooid ay dam

If tar tMaoot of tot F«ao\keAJ h> Leader at tmt aaw of toe oaaoal aowooaaag tAewof %ttmtt eaceed tAe i
a> promde for tot pa^Meoi *>f »awr ami «rwer raie%. uar>. a*w»*WMt. aworaaig panaroa*. M M M « • « Oiaer l a
cact«> «AalI be aediwd to l u r r o * t f »»• the a n t MnotM> MMallowot to iMiaHawMt «*f FoooS 4*t \( %
Leader th«il ht W-«.» than the «M«H*O« deeated oeve%wr> o> Leoder u* pay • • w r aad wwer t*t\. u i r t . iiMiioiran M
Other iMptMMMMu. i% iHey f*il due. I n r m v e r Uull pay o* Leader aay I O I I O H aecrt*ary a« aiaAe op Mot deaaeary « a A M tewty day* i
from Leader to aorrwur reaorMuif payawot ttwrt«»f
U f t M o W n m r r » hre^-a *if aoy tmea<ioi *w 4freeateot *»f l i t m w r t M O W Iwwro—OI. Leader awy appry. « aoy a MOOT, t aad m aoy order aa
Leoder vh»iS deterroioe in Leoder \ «i«* dmretuM. ^n> Ft*od« arid o> Leader at Vat uow of appo&auuo 11) to p«y rata, ttm* taatv omiiownii
a*wraace prrroiwM* 40U Other Imnmitrnm » h n h 4rr m#m «M onli oereafter Ninow A t . or < u | a% • rreda agaaM loan tewred by tK» totfrvowm
Upon payment M foil of 4ll M U M mitred by ihn loMrnowm. Leader <Aall pM4otat> refooaj m jueroort aay FoooH arid by Leader
X A m j C A T f O * O r WAS AfrrVTS. ( nA>% ^nptK^nw ( J » nr«mde% oroerortw. «rT nayowots i m w i l by Leoder frum oWrnwer ooder rot Mow
mt tho laurvmeot Otail be jftalied b> Leoder to the i*4liM»Mg «irder «if pmtmy (11 I O M H I H rwyabw *» Leoder by A t w w n ooder paragraph 2
hereof. 1 u 1 rnwmi fuy^ble ••*» the N*N<. I IN > nnoufui of the N*oe. I tv 1 one re M payjbtr <*o advaour* aude paoMiani K> nar^f raph I hrnvf. ( * I
pnaapa) o( advam-rs made purMMfti w» naragr^oh « hrm.f. 1 vi 1 Mterta n«y«Mr » • aoy Fytore Ad*am.r. pnmded *rui if oturt than not Fotort
Advance u .»wt<uanding. Lender m^> apply ru>mcm% tv\n*t%l aono^ tor aaowou «»f M W U M oay«ble no toe Fwore Ad«aMT% 10 un-h order at
Lender. 10 Lender % MW> amretn*n. ma> determine. i « u i pnoorui ««f *n> Ftoore Advance. pn*nme4 tbat if r^we than uoe Fot^re A4»aoce a
aaruaading. Lender m«> appt> payowntk reevrvrd aonMg the pnmtpal baiaoan nf the Fonw» Ad*a««t. M ^oeb order a* Lender, m Lender * «ok
ducretmn. ma> determine, and I v o i ao% .nhrr s«ms >nurrti by tbo. Inwrnawm m M K A I W 9 >r a« Lender, at Lender % not* <>. may determioe;
artHideJ b o w o r r thai Lender mat at Lender * timnm. apot> any %om% payahw ponoam s* paragraph * oerenf pnor m i a u n 1 on and anoupal
of tot Nioe. hot M*n apr»'~-««»»« «hali M «Mner%ne arTni toe «*rder ««f pnom> nf app*a,ai»M ««eaoed m rh» paragraph )
4 CMAtCF.S: 1.IFNS. K*n>*+ti Oiail pay all «awr aod «r«er raan. rent* war* e%wwntm», premMjon. anm Other ImpoMnnm annAotabk tu
tot Pnpen> ai Lrndci \ «»pti>«o in the manner pnmded under paragraph 2 hereof or. if m * pud 10 m i maoner. by o v r r a n maaiog payment,
•men due. dtrecti) u» the payee thereof «* m unh ««tber manner 4% Lender May designate m »m*ng I n m ' t r sAail roomptty furonh m Lender all
aouret nCamowm* dor under thn paragraph 4 and in tbr evrni Inrmwet <Aa!l maie payowot daretiy. tnentwer «Aaif promptly fomoA 10 Lendei
recrtpu rvidcmmg wufi payment m»m>«er «Aa« pntmptry dmAarge any hen w b * n Aa%. nr O M « ha«c. prointy nver or eaualny o-n 1 the hen <U
tow Instrument and litrrtmer Utaii f*4). •hem due the vlaim* «W all per«m« toppiymg lanar or otawrv'< u»«« m U M W H I M I woh ••»• Pfofrny
Withoui Lender \ pr*>>r » m i r n f»rmo.»oHi. »»rri««er shall O N aPn« any hen mwmn u» thK loMraawnt n> he pertevwd agaioM the aumrrty
1 H ALA I D I b i M B A N C F . tnm»«er shall i e e r ibr imnit««ement« now eiwaag or oerc«fwt craned 0 0 thr Property wi ureal by earner*, at at
ujnei katislMiitry u> Lender against h*»» by Art. KuAt4+ Muvtudrd vuhui the wrm "tawnded uneragr". rem los* aod vu«.-h «*her haiardk. catoaltun
aabrlitwk aod contingent** a« Lender 1 and. if ton losituoteoi n no - wawhidd. aw gmond tr««e 1 *Aail require aod m * m * amooon and Uw m t
penodi a» lender mail require All rnrmiwnHno MHoramr pt*har« *Aai» be pool at Lender»oemim. M thr Manner powoled under paragraph 1
hereof or by •urrowet owAtng payownt nhen due. dare»ity n> the wamer. or m i m n <nhet a>anori a* Leader may anognaw m wrawig
Ail insurance pouoet and renemaK therenf shall he M a f«tfM aortfJiahw u> Leader •** J u U oniutw a siaodard oweigage ctaune M favor W
and in form acceptable to Lender Lender shall have the nght m hnad the anAoev aod aVwnover shall pnunwly formsh ui Lender ail renewal
aouon and all rrueipn nf paid premium* Ai teaw rhtrty «ays nrwr 10 the eipwaiuM Aaw 0 / a pnfavy. • o r r o u n shall aelivvr to Lmder a w w i
policy in (orm %au%faetory m Lender If this fnvrament n «m a leasehnoi. lorroner shall furooA Leader a duaimir of ail pnhvsn renroai oouce>
renewal nohmrs aad njcvtpts «*f paid pnmiun» if. hy vutue ««f the grinrnd irate, the nrujioait rnttvof May on» he sutnahed by fairrooer a> Lender
In the event of Iota. Borrower shall give imMediaw wojrwn oooce m the Msoraace carm
empowen Lender •» aMumey«m>fast Asr Bortttwer u» asaae prruii of UM*. to adyu«i and . u M p n M
aad pruwvow aoy acuon an%mg fnmi sosh tosoraocr pnmn>. u% udlrvr aod i m m u>soranrt M M I H 1 aod m deduct t he re fWHO Lender's eapenaei X ^
awemftrd or the wUect*** %tf<m& pmcewaV. fm*»MfW o n o r u i . oWc ouoAonx mar aim a4 m Wi» ooragrapA 1 sooA* na;uire Leader « mru^ aay rcarnor r^y
or ia4r any •*!».•* hereunder Inrnvwer lunhrr autruwiar* Lender ai I ender\ nft*«o u ) tu Iwdd the boianie nf such p m u i d i M he used » Q
aumhurw •orrower lot the sirst t*t reMuwirnvtum m repuor of the rHnprrry or < h 1 m af fiy the haiame of «uvh pn^reds m the payment of the sum* __
wrured by tho Inurument whether i a am then due. m the neder of appMsawaa net lorrh m aofagfiph ) Iwraof \uanyect. h o u e u r m the rajaw af i *
nw WMOr ooder the grawnd urate if this owwwMent o> on a wauehooj I
""*

:cn

If the aauraact ptuvwdi an heni hy Lender tn ryimhorw Boiiauii war aw aaw of nmorowao aad ofpaa of aw h a p n i ) . mm P i u p i i i | onnfl M T ? " ^
awaonrd w the eanuvahrat of a» orygnui aaadimm or such onhrr awwaaaa at Lender a a y i p p m M arniog Leader awy. at Leader 1 a a a w J j T
a w d i t a a dMhurwawnt of ia«d prauedi aa Lender k *»•***
mt surh ptao* aad ip^iaiauua)i of ao awhawei laaafaeawy a Leader, aawarmnmt 1^
mm euMoawv arehNecti omiacawi. waevan of Wen*, •warn MOM menu of awchanan and MimrsaJoujn aod uath mher evownor of a a w . penwauje
ooapwtoM uf oiniirwruoo apfhsauoo of paymeau. aad wwafacotia af uem a Lender awy n
hry mojoou If the aiiiraaw aeoooon* are
aaplwd a the paynwnt of the aam% ufcurtd ay ihn lauruowat. any uuch appheswon of piauua> a prwaawl ihaM o a eiwnd or pawgane aw due
ooon of the owmthly a i t a l l a i n t i u w i u d a a aorafraph* I aad 2 heeanf or canape the aanooaw of sorh uwaailnwnw If the rSaamy • aad
panoaot a paragraph 27 hereof or if Lender a c a a m atw a the Pruamy Lender ihail hen* ad of the ngbt. a w ond awiew of t a t a o n a and a
aay a n u r a a a aomws and uovaraed p w a i u a i iherooo amgmammmmu anwawdt rewuhag frwa aay d a a i f r a dw P i a w i i j f a a i • a n a a n t mt

4 * l t K I V A T 1 0 N APIO M A l n f l X M A N C T O f P w O T f l T Y ; I X A j n * O U M L
w i w i a i a a i a of aw rVaperry. 1 b > ahah a a aaaaaaa nw Piawret. U I aaaii a w n o
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r eabaiod from B>i«o«w*r t a t bee* •mamed a3 m a n a j d n r * objrb n mrwed by t h * l a i i r a m n i or evvarwa.* by h* NAOJ mi
• mer.vtt •% weM w ail other t * o t g c « * * * * * * mmmnm* w o * tosh taJehtednem wharh cortawoie »aarmi thaii be O M M J V h*
l a a r f a p r e a d d w e r t t e o a a r t ' e r m o f i b e N m * \ ' a i m art I W m manned by aamt*abar law t o t * «Uoca*im t a . t p r e r - . ^ Uiail he ewacard
ee a a * * a oeooer ma tb* roar of l a i i m i oaai r e d tberrjy * aaafaroi taawoghoat to* «*ao*d rnrrn of tb* Note
n
W A I V E . OF f T A T I ' t T OT I J M I T A I A J P *
aoewoni haerhy wamet * h * rtfbt aa amen aay t i a t u t ot L ^ t a u o m « a bar m the
c o ^ r a e m r o of liar bra of t b * l * a r * a e n « or aa aoy eroon beam** » en'oror tb* H a w or aoy other «**#atmo W*WJ*«I by <b» intarwmrn*
M.

W A I V E ! O f M A O S M A U J f t H * hjevoemauaeoig tba eaaMcocp of aoy other oxoroy aaan nat m th* Proper^ hrid by Uode? m to. aoy um.t

pony Lewder thai* have tb* rigor w a w i f M w th* order m obach any or all of the Ptupaity tlteil bt tohareted u» the rvmrdan pi<~**4
bama
Laoakr ibafl ba«r iba n f b i to omraiiaa tb* oraJrr M aybjcb aay a» ab powwaj of aba woabaida»ia w r w r a brrrby are vM»brd iroaa tbc p,mm4%
mmmi
M O M (be tatauaa of tba * t * a 4 a n o n m o r ^ barcin torrowat aoy oarry v b o oaoioou to i n * Inuntmmt *m4 sity oany »b-> a r « or
• r v t A r r a a * * * * ? aacomy H M M V M » t b c > - « r . n a o j » b r baa anoai or o a a m M K amass bcf**»f l « ' r b y •«•««- any «ntf aii r^bi M taajmat aba
i arwb tm tataewa of a»» of tba faaaaoaai aan—art by looiKaNr l a * or ptonOrd >
3.
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mfnmn

»mm

m awoy

w«b ib* owooaon * ^

oioaUi«>o% of tbc ^oatfrwetaa* Loaa

bfraaaMin if aay a/bicb i> bwrby Maaoffaaraard by « * b f r a a w i ^ awaaV i w ^ i O t taajmaaaw< AM ««-«.itcT> « « b * y U o o c r r w v t M i «a th«
t a a a w m m Loat. A f ivraarm UuH b* oWtbiadaaat of • o w o a m aaiaatal by «ba> l a n m o w i aaa tocb a d « « » * » « * y N. obbgafc -y a* orov«a>o w
C!ar Ctaatnamoa Lc»e Aa/Kftnaot All U W M aiioowai by U o o r r fina* to pjwaicMoa of tb* mioaaoaaanw *o fmmxn the «cnimy «if rba> lajaamaarM
v ta -b* f n a a i p i l amoooi of tb* Waar tbaft b* tiraaf* a* onOomawatt oanataM to tb* Cooatmciaoa U a n Agrramcnt All %w.b t « r . t d u l l bear
a - t n a v from aba tfaar of a n b o m r o o t at tb* • « uaaro u» tb* Note a o i t u oalwcwoa fiooi •urroocr of OMCTCU at \mh rate « * « M b* omirar- to
a o o b i i l l i l a * m wbtcb p a w tort* aaJtouott tbaii ocar tttannt at tba b i f b m rata vbacb tmam m colkciea1 froaa l o r m o ^ i aoorr apoJimbar l a * and
abaii b* oayaMc opaa aatietr r m a Lrodct to • o m j a u r tiajaaitirt payaarot abcirfor
Ffos»aao* u» OOJC aa Leader 4etm* oronaary to protect trader v w r m u . l o c w t i %b«ll aptw PPHVTM ot UmJcr eaavote aod deltwr to
Laadot aa uasb form aa Lco^er ihaH dtrvrt »mt*i~"m
of aoy aod all nfbtt or darait *bm-b iriatc H. tb* vuoMr^t^n «»ib* Property *nd vtacH
l o w o i t oiay ba«e afaaau a t y Parry topptytftf or
• *>« aappbed tabor ajMHcrulaor arrvMCt m aoroei5«i«t witb omunKtM » <»i \\ t *mp*>
in
C*<« of baeacb by l o r r o * < i of tb* cowtuint aod uaodit aa of tb* CooMmcuoa -^aa Atreeme-. Lraorr at Lroder»••rtuott » n b or wtibout .•aary
• p u t tbc Pfopcny ( i \ ouy mmke aoy of tb* ngbu ut r*«aedo> provtocd to tbc Coourttcupo Loan Agree neat \ a ) m*v aodrwrate tbc w » >
o j r u t d by tb« ldau#otrot aod otvobc tbow reaaadvk providea w parafrarb 2? hereof or ( u i ) eaay do both If «fter tr«e coour> jatmc
of
aiooruuaoo of tbc Now tbc Now aod t b * auntment «ic told by Lender froot aod after vavb * * k tb* Coo^rycu MI Loan A f revment Uult veaac
aa be a port of U*» Inurjmem aod o o r / • * » tAati not ^taert aoy ngbt or* art<orT uowoarrdatoi or otber c Mtn m detente *n*u+
O M 4 « W I with tbc r n o u m c v o a Loao AtrreraciM aiaMtai to* obbcauooa of tb* Note aod t b * Inkimment

not of or to

H
A S S I C N M C V T O F t C K T S . A P P O I N T M E N T O F I t C E I V f l L E N D M t 1*4 PO^SCSSUON
A^ pan o< '*« uMMdarauon I r r tb*
aideba»docu cwdeacrd by tbc Note l o r r o * e r bereby jKotoarty aod aooBadiuunai y aaMfnt ^od traoaarn to Lender all the renu ao«i rrveoon of
tbc Ptupcny aadodiot (bote n o * dot p»»i due ot to becom
< by victor of aoy «aMt»»» other agfceaaroi UM tbc i«u.-upafKy or mm ot aii or «oy
pan of Ha> Propcrry reaarJieu of to vbont *hc rent* uA r e v c ^ j n of the Property are p a w M e Borrower hereby -«Mbitrue» Lender or Lrndrr %
i f t a o to oollect the af »cvaid ren» aod rev*noe« aod berrby daracu cacb anuat of tb* Property to pay u»cb renu a* Lrndrr or i^roakr v afeota.
pojiiidld however Uut prior to written aotaar f i*en by Lendei to aWniwer of bar becaefc by •orrow«r of any %o%etM it i»r jfrretnem of aWrower
aa tba inaawjaarat •ort^wet d u l l oaiteci aod m e m *H renn aod r r v m w n of tb* Property a» tnot-e <or tbc benrbi «*f Lender *ml o w r o w t i to
appry tb* rroo aod i r * r o t a n aa eoibxard to tbv toon *Kmtr-l >y t b * loMnrmcw ut tbc order provided to parafriprt J bc.'of with tbc HsUmx %n
wa% aa oo wach b «acb kat ocrorred to the j c w a o i of Botrowif it brmf toarnocd by Burro we i and Lender ^ a t t b * amfitnient of r r o * c3om*tt«tn
« • abaoiaac aaaifnnient aod not an awtfoment (o jdditir*nai trcunty «*J* Vr*
debwry of wmaro noajur by Lrndrr n. *»m»wrr «»f tb* otr+.h by
Borrower of any oowetunt or aftecment of Borrower in tbii loumajirr? aod owi oo* tb* nruriaMy of Lender e o a m o | wpoo aod u k i * f «nd
^ n r * i n r r t (u I oomroi of the Proprrry ir pervwt oy agent nr by a coo* •ppeanatw receiver Lrndrr tball Momaiuaariy he entitled m puur»«*Ht.»!
ail *eai' aod u •avca o Kc Proorrry as »rmincd m t b * parair^pb H u tbc wuo* baenrne doc and \. «>4b*e uadodu>{ but not iiooird to renu tb n
4*t and oopaaa aod all tweb mta tball uBmrdutcty opon delivery of u*cn aomar be held by aV»rrowrr aa tnaMee for the neneH of Lroder out
p*ovic#d howrvet *ha. tbc emtteo m>uur by Lender to Borrower of ib* bceacb by Borrower »b4'l ronuin a uatemrni thai L m ^ r r caermrk tu
Ogbu tu a*sb rrnt
Borrower afreet thai oaoimrocinf upon d>bv*ry of toJt wetuen nouue of Borrower s h r r ^ A hy Lender to Borrower ea^b
hems rt of tb* P»*>p»ny Uuil mabc M r b rrnti payable in and pay t jrb reon to Lender or Lender t a f r n n on Lender» written demand w> tack tenjnt
aarnefor deii n*4 m each m u n i prraonaiiy by m«ti 01 *y oewvenna t*xb mmmd 10 ca*.h reouii ut* wttbu>«< any tuhdHy *m the nan of w.»d
amaoi to inajoare fyrtber at aa abc eaawencc ot a defawit by Borrower
Borrower b c o y oawenantt that Borrower bat not eircmed aey prior a»Mf «me it of uud rrott rbot B o r w e t bat out performed and %•#! n»*
parfnim .ay acu or baa not enecwatd and will not caccwat anv iriun*oarni wlwcb would prevent Lender from eterounc i u right nndei bo
poragrapb ^e aod that at the urn* of eareiMion of t b * i n u m m r m there ha* been no aauuparion c* prrpayoieni of any of the renn o the Property
tm more than iwe oaonrbt p-ior » tbc dot date* of tovb r e r u Borrower oovtrnanu that Borrower wdl not hereafter oottrci or oavpt payment of
toy renu of the Property more than two aaoatbt pnor 10 tr-e dwe doict of twrb renu Bunooci fortbrr «cvenantt that Borrower wdi emev-we ami
dab>n aa Ltodcr tucb fonbat aatignmenu of renu ad revenoet of wc Property at Lewder may from tauie *o uaac reoortt
Upoo Borrower % breach of any oawnam ot areetnewi of Bonoocr m mm Inacnmrm Ltodcr may m p m o n by ageor t* by a ooortamaomard raoyrver m f a r d a m of tbc adaooacy of Under % tommy eaarr opon aod u b e aod moNMaan full osntml of tb Pn«p*-<) to oroer to
prrfona aii gem oaoiatory cod appeopnaar for tbc oprrauon aor* maaaaracorr tbereo' mdwdtac hoi not UmNed to th r«rvwaon .aoceilaoon ot
ojonjnranna r f waact tbe aoifccjon of all renu aoo r r v m w n of the Piopery tbc ou>aa«f of repaan ic the Proper*? aod tbc ea*\ww*c or
aommaima of a o o u o m provtdmg for t b * n^a^gemrnt or matoaroaoar of tb* P r o p r m ail on tovb t e r n * *% an deemed bett to prowxi tbe tromry
of t b * lotamn--wi la tb* event Lrndrr earn to « e i tb- appototmrnt of a reenvrr for tbc Property opon Borrower 1 breatb of aoy oaveoam or
ag/ltaMOi ot Borroocr m t b * Inatfi'met' lorrower bereby etpreatly u n a * no IM U.* app'imamot of totb reccrver Leader or toe receiver J u l l be
Osmond aa I O O J I U a maaonibk me for *» manifing tbc Propcrry
ABitomaa*1mvmoa»ioyHacatdiMba*o^

oWiooer of aoy covemam «w

* of Borrower » t b * laam»mrm aball b* app - d bna aa tb* ootu if aoy of taaaog umrm

m aod m.nagtog the Propeny and oamrvuaf tb*

. o«r not banted aa attorney . feet receiver % f o n premmmt wo reuener i boor«t oaa* »»f repam u tb* Pioperry ptimiami on
m

ail 111 m i an and otbrr cbarget oo tbc Property aod tb* * oat tif d o * b a ~ * * 4 ««y obitgaiion or babtbty of Borrower at ^

amtor ot ^awdlord of tb* Property aod the* te tbc t*ma aacwed by t b * laowomem

Lewder or tlu r e e f e r tbaM bav* aoaeia to tb* b>omt aod f ^

aaaord. oaad 10 tbc eparauon aod mtiotmaoie of tb* Propeny aod tbail be babar * • aatmot woiy fnr tbow rent* mtwallr reomed

Lroder s**M • «

*

Br Labor « Borrower anyone d a t o u r f joder or tbeoagh Bortuoai or anyone bavtog an orirreti m tb* Pruperry by reaaon of an»bang d>m* or leA T ^
aoaVMe by Learner acme? t b * paragraph 2a

&

tf tbc r e o * of tbe Propeny are not iwmeatot to meet tb* oaao, d*aoy of taaaog amtrvi of and managing the Paopeny aod urdbreoa; tbe reoat

^

toy roaoa eapradtrf by Learner for taxb porpoart tbail beaome maabardnni of loraower 10 Uoder «ceored by t b * Inummen. ponataot 10 ' .
f«««rna)b I hereof

Uoieat Lender aod Bononci agree u w m m * to other arrm» of payment m*+ ammaait tbail be payable agon 00001 from T

U o o e r » Borrower roawrtiaM ^ y a w n t tberenf aod tbail brar m n w from the daar of m t t n r o t r ' at -be rate uated m tbc Not* oairtt poymeot
of man mi a« aacb rear oooid be aootrary 10 ipmajaabar l a * m obacb event ^arb aaaowou t*«U bear matrett at tbc bajbett ram obawb may b*#JO>
aaaiacaad from Boreaur wader uppln a t b law
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IN Wrrwcss WMatof. Borrtywer has executed ihts lajtrumeat or has caused the same to be executed by its repfeaeaiauves
duiv authorized
QAKH I LIS PARTNERSHIP f
a Utah Limited Partnership
8*; Pacific Western JiidustrifJuJLnc.-...
a Utah Corporation
General Partner

/^CMOJU4»A^-

cya Pacific Western industries lac—
c8 South M a m btreet. Suite
S a l t LAke C i t y . Utah 84101

$

<mmT*$mmn>

CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Sraft o» UTAH,

..

. Corny at.

On thai
day of
It ....„ personally i
._
^ the signer of the foregoing ttummcst, who, being by mm duly sworn, dad say,
that he • the '.
of
. . .
a corporation, and that theforegoinginstrument was signed m
behalf of said corporation by authority of tu Board of Directors. *md acknowledged to me that uud corporation ciccuted the same

Notary Public Rending at:
INDIVIDUAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Stan Of UTAH,
On this

County is
. ...

day of

, 19

— personally appeared before me
.• the ttgnerts) of the foregoing muniment who.

being duly sworn acknowledged to me that ..he .. executed the same
My commotion expires
Notary Public Rending at
INDIVIDUAL LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STAT* Of UTAH

-

On this

County ss

day of

19

, personally appeared before me
. ...
.the signer< s) of the foregoing instrument who
bong by me duty sworn, did u> that he
general pannen s) of
_
, a limited partnership, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said limited partnership, and
acknowledged to me that said limited partnership executed the same
~

My commission expires
Notary Public Residing at
CORPORATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACKNOWLEDGMENT
STATI or UTAH.

-3f£*

aPdS^aT

County ss

On this Z y * day of
/ft&C<>f'
personally appeared before me &"*&*
" ^
% l 9 J?
smaTttiA/p<^^*v^^/^^*>fRe9\igncf»of
the foregoing instrument who being by me duly sworn, did say, thatmar* ihe
dS+x**m*SS&2'*m*'r
of / ^ ^ / V c **.^;€&V*****fses. /s*c
.. a corporation general
partner of ^ ^ *&**** /*5+Gr<*4ff^?*Ce^Q
. * limited partnership, and that said instrument was
signed tn behalf of said limited partnership by authority flfch* Board of Directors of said general partner, and acknowledged to me
that said limited partnership executed the same jd^\\
j
My commission expires

^-f—JL^

ff<*.

/

\ V >

J/^

YNOTATiYVi
DTTET I P

l

5

< f ^ ^ , -..
Notary P&blic Residing at

(«a*aW<J &&*<***

IE&IEST FOIC^£CONVEYANCE
To TIUSTU

The undersigned is the holder of the note or notes secured by this Instrument Said note or notes, together with a A other
mdehtedneu vetured by tht» Instrument have been paid in full You are hereby directed to cancel said note or notes ;nd »his
Instr ment which Art delivered hereby and to reoonvey. without warranty, all the esutc now held by you under this Instrument to
one person or persons legally entitled thereto
Date

UTAH-MnJufimiJ>-l/77-rNMA/VHLMC Uniform laatrwaacwt

Cnnwf «ff a

Isbibit A
letiaaia* at tbt o»st Southerly corner of a 12.00 foot right of *ey (Idvards aad
DaaitU)» aaid coraar being North 0*14* 34" last a loot tba quartet aectioa line
569.46 faat aad last 494.97 foot froo tbo coat or of Soctioa U , Township 1 South,
loots 1 l a t t . Salt Lake laao aad Mendiaa, aad ruaaiat tboace lortb 26*09* last
aloft* tbo Soutbeettarly lima of said ri$bt of way 12.00 foot; tbomco lortb 63*51*
Host 10.04 foot to a poiat oa a 74.5 foot radiua curve to tbo loit tbo coatcr of
vbich boari lortb 6*17'21* Voat; tboaco aortheeaterly aloat tbo arc of said curve
69.56 foot to a poiat of taatoacy; tboaco lortb 30*13* last 184**2 foot to a poiat
of a 29.28 foot radiaa carve to tbo right; tboaco Northeasterly aloat tbo arc of
aaid carve 23.00 foot to a poiat of a 39.0 foot radius reverse carta to tbo l t f t ,
tbo coattr of which'bears lortb 14*47* Voat; tbaoct Northeasterly aloat tbo arc of
aaid curve 49.66 foot; tboaco lortb 48*00' laat 44.63 foot; tbomco South 89*54* last
127.08 foot; tboaco South 0*06* Vast 114.45 foot; tboaca South 52*45' Voat 0.75 foot
to a poiat oa tbo Northwesterly liaa of Keaaedy Drive, said poiat alto beiag oa a
curve ta tba l e f t , the coattr of which boara South 12*39' Hoot 50.00 foot; tboaco
Soutbwoaterly aloat taid Northwesterly liao aad aloat tbo arc of aaid curve 104.41
foot to a poiat of a reverse carve to tbo right, the castor of which heart South 73*
Vest 35.36 ' t o t ; theace Southerly aloat the arc of taid curve 27.77 feet to a poiat
of taatoacy; theace South 28* Vest 27.27 foot to a poiat of a 1675.00 foot radiut
carve to the l e f t ; tboace Southwesterly aloat the arc of taid curve 160.79 feet to a
poiat of taa«eacy; tboaca South 22*30' Vett 16.43 feet; tboaca lortb 63*51' vett
225.65 foot to tbo poiat of betinnmg.
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GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, a
Colorado corporation, Plaintiff,
v.
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, Ron Mast as assignee
of the rights of Intermountain Glass
and Paint Company, a Utah corporation, United Pacific Reliance Insurance
Company, a Washington corporation,
and Oakhills Condominium Limited
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership, Defendants and Appellants.
Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, a Utah corporation, Crossclaim
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, United Pacific Reliance Insurance Company, a Washington corporation, and Oakhills Condominium Limited Partnership, a Utah
limited partnership, Crossclaim Defendants and Appellant.
Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, a Utah corporation, Third-party
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
STATE SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION; Utah State Tax Commission;
Robert P. Hansen; Capitol Glass &
Aluminum; Ron Mast as assignee of
the rights of Debenham Electrical Supply Co.; Electro Tech Corporation;
Ron Mast as assignee of the rights of
Marathon Steel Company; Edwards &
Daniels Associates; and John Brown &
Associates; and John and Jane Does 1
thru 100, Third-party Defendants and
Appellants.
Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of
Marathon Steel Company, an Arizona
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; Oakhills Condomin-

ium Limited Partnership, a Utah limited partnership; and United Pacific Reliance Insurance Company, a Washington corporation. Defendants and Appellant.

MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, Third-part)
Plaintiff and Appellant,
y.

PACIFIC WESTERN INDUSTRIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation, Oakhills Condominium Limited Partnership, a Utah
limited partnership, and Edwards &
Daniels Associates, Inc., Third-party
Defendants.

AMERICAN SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION, a California corporation,
formerly State Saving* and Loan Association, Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
OAKHILLS PARTNERSHIP, a Utah liraited partnership; Pacific Western of
Utah, Inc., a Utah corporation, formerly Pacific Western Industries, Inc., a
Utah corporation; Charles Wr. Akerlow;
Richard J. Anderson: State Tax Commission of Utah, Robert P. Hansen;
Capital Glass and Aluminum Corporation, a Utah corporation; Ron Mast as
assignee of the rights of Debenham
Electric Supph Company, Inc., an
Alaska corporation; Electro Technical
Corp., a Utah corporation; Ron Mast as
assignee of the rights of Intermountain
Glass & Paint Co., a Utah corporation;
General Glass Corp., a Colorado corporation; Ron Mast as assignee of the
rights of Marathon Steel Co., an Arizona corporation; Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc., a Utah corporation; Ogden's Carpet Outlet, a Utah corporation; Mast Construction Co., a Utah
corporation; Mildred S. Freymuller;
and John Does 1 thru 30, Defendants
and Appellants.
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Ron MAST as assignee of the rights of
Debenham Electric Supply Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

\.
ELECTRO TECHNICAL CORPORATION, Mast Construction Company, the
Oakhills Partnership, and United Pacific Insurance Company, Defendants and
Appellants.
No. 860355-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
June 10, 198S.
Lawsuits were brought to establish
priority of liens in connection with condominium construction project. The Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Timothy
Hansen, J., entered judgment declaring
lender's deed of trust to be valid hen and to
have priority over all other hens, and general contractor and contractor's president
appealed The Court of Appeals, Davidson,
J., held that as a consequence of actual
notice of deed of trust to general contractor's president, deed of trust was valid and
bmdmg lien as to contractor and president
Affirmed.

ERSHIP, a Utah limPacific Western of
corporation, formern Industries, Inc., a
Charles W. Akerlow;
ion: State Tax CornRobert P. Hansen;
Aluminum Corporaration; Ron Mast as
ights of Debenham
Compan> t Inc., an
it; Electro Technical
oration; Ron Mast as
hts of Intermountain
a Utah corporation;
p., a Colorado corpoas assignee of the
1 Steel Co., an Arizoiwards & Daniels Asah corporation; Oget, a Utah corporaauction Co., a Utah
Ired S. Freymuller;
thru 30. Defendants

Jackson, J., concurred in result only
and filed opinion.
Condominium ^ 5
Deed of trust securing loan funding
construction of condominium project was
valid and binding hen as to general contractor and general contractor's president as
consequence of president's actual notice of
deed of trust; subordination agreement executed on general contractor's behalf m
favor of lender was dated day of closing,
signed by general contractor's president
and contained legal description the same as
that depicted on deed of trust, and lender's
representative testified that subordination
agreement had been executed by time of
closing. U.C.A.1953, 57-1-6 (Repealed).
Ronald C Barker (argued), Salt Lake
City, for appellants, Mast & Mast Const
Warren Patten, W. Cullen Battle (argued). Douglas B Cannon, Salt Lake City,
for respondents, American Sa\. & Loan
Assoc.

Jeffery B Brown, Salt Lake Cit>, for
Electrical Technical Corp & Capita) Glass
& Aluminum
R Stephen Marshall, Salt Lake City, for
Edwards & Daniels
Paul R Howell, Salt Lake City, for United Pacific Ins
John C. Green, III Sail Lake City, for
Electro Technical
Leland S. McCullough, Jr., Salt Lake
City, for Mildred Freymuller.
James E Boevers, Salt Lake City, for
Western State Title
David Black, Stephen Marshall, Salt
Lake City, Van Cott, Bagle\, Cornwall &
McCarthy for Edwards & Daniels
Before Judges DAVIDSON, BENCH
and JACKSON
OPINION
DAVIDSON, Jjdge
American Savings and Loan Association
(American) loaned funds to the Oakhills
Partnership (Oakhills) for the construction
of Oakhills Condominiums. Oakhiils a
Utah limited partnership, had Pacific Western Industries, Inc (Pacific Western), a
Utah corporation, as the general partner
Charles W Akerlow (Akerlov.) and Richard
J. Anderson (Anderson) were respectively,
chairman of the board and president of
Pacific Western
The March 2b, 1983, loan from American
to Oakhills was secured by a promisson
note and a deed of trust Akerlow and
Anderson signed the deed of trust but the
loan amount, date of the note, identin of
the trustee, and the seal of Pacific Western
were omitted The deed of trust was recorded with the Salt Lake County Recorder
on April 8, 1983 It was rerecorded oi>
April 20, 1983 The date and the amount
of the note were added at that time An
"X" was placed over the initial recording
with a line-out placed on the book and pag*
numbers of that recording On April 26,
1983, Western State? Tule Compam (West
em States) was added to the deed of trust
as trustee and the April 20th recording was
crossed out in the same manner At trial,
Akerlow testifier! the deed of trust, "as
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completely filled in," conformed to "the
terms of [the] deal" with American.
Jeffrey J. Jensen (Jensen), vice president
of Western States, acknowledged the deed
of trust in his capacity as a notary public.
He testified that he could not "remember
specifically"
whether
Akerlow
and
Anderson were present when he acknowledged their signatures. Neither could Jensen state whether the two officers of Pacific Western were placed under oath "as to
their corporate authority1." Jensen did testify that it was his "customary practice" to
have the parties sign documents "at the
time of closing" and he would acknowledge
them. It wras not his practice to place them
under oath. Additionally, Jensen testified
to his personal knowledge of Akerlow and
Anderson.
A representative of American testified
that Jensen, Akerlow, and Anderson were
present at the closing. He also testified
Ronald E. Mast, president of Mast Construction Company, the general contractor,
wras present for a portion of the closing.
The representative could not remember exactly how the closing was conducted. Ron
Mast denied he was present at the closing,
that he had ever seen American's representative prior to the trial, and that he had
ever been "to the business" of Wrestem
States.
Ron Mast claimed work began on Oakhills Condominiums prior to April 8, 1983,
the date of the initial recording of the deed
of trust by American. However, the notice
of lien recorded by Mast Construction Company indicated April 28, 1983, as the date
the "first labor, material and equipment
was performed." In an answer to an interrogatory, Ron Mast listed April 18, 1983, as
the date on which "work was commenced,
or materials were furnished on the ground
for the structure, or improvement constructed on the property." Roger J. Mast,
vice president of Mast Construction Company, was questioned at trial about his deposition. There, he answered that he "started the job" on April 18, 1983.
1. Other lien claimants have assigned theii
claims to Ron Mast resulting in his being an
appellant personally as well as president of

W. David Hammons (Hammons), president of Electro Technical Corporation (Electro Tech) and a subcontractor on Oakhills
Condominiums, filed a notice of lien which
indicated May 6, 1983, as the date Electro
Tech commenced work. However, Hamrnons testified at trial a temporary power
panel and pole, a coil of wrire, and some
conduit were placed at the building site on
April 6, 1983. Mast Construction Company
relies on Electro Tech's placement of electrical equipment at the site to establish the
priority of its lien over American's deed of
trust.
Another lienholder filed a complaint on
March 14, 1985, to foreclose its lien on
Oakhills Condominiums. Other similar actions were consolidated with the result that
Mast Construction Company and Ron Mast
are appellants and American the respondent.^ On June 19, 198G, the trial court
granted American partial summary judgment which stated the deed of trust at
issue, as recorded on April 8, 1983, was
operative as either a deed of trust or mortgage. The court reserved the propriety of
the signatures' acknowledgment and the
date work commenced on Oakhills Condominiums for the bench trial which was held
on July 25 and 26, 1986. An order for
entry of final judgment was filed on November 18, 1986, whicii ^declared American's deed of trust was a valid lien against
Oakhills Condominiums and had priority
over all other liens against that project.
The trial court directed the entry of judgment as final pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P.
54(b).
Appellants present twro issues for review;
(1) was the recording of the deed of trust
as it appeared on April 8, 1983, effective in
view of the omissions thereon and that the
signators were not placed under oath; and
(2) did the placement of the electrical equipment at the building site of Oakhills Condominiums on April 6, 1983, constitute commencement to do work for purposes of
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5 (1974)°
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Utah R.Civ.P. 52(a) requires that findings of fact "shall not be set aside unless
Mast Construction Company, the other appellant
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clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
However, we accord the trial court's conclusions of law no particular deference, but
review them for correctness. Scharf u
BUG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah
1985).
THE DEED OF TRUST
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986) states:
Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth
an agreement to convey any real estate
or wrhereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged
and certified in the manner prescribed by
this title and recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which such real
estate is situated, but shall be valid and
binding between the parties thereto without such proofs, acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other
persons who have had actual notice
(emphasis added).
The "actual notice" exception to the requirement that a conveyance or instrument
be validly recorded to impart notice to third
persons is discussed in Johnson v. Bell, 666
P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). There the Utah Supreme Court stated actual notice was a
question of fact. The Court wrote:
This statute was under examination by
this Court in Toland v. Corey, 6 Utah
392, 24 P. 190 (1890), where we held that
the "actual notice" required by § 57-1-6
wras satisfied if a party dealing with the
land had information of facts which
would put a prudent man upon inquiry
and which, if pursued, would lead to actual knowledge as to the state of the
title. See a similar expression in McGarry v. Thompson, 114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d
288 (1948).
Id. at 310. Accord Stumph v. Church, 740
P.2d 820 (Utah App.1987).
In the instant case it is not necessary to
address the "duty to inquire" prong of
actual notice. The record on appeal contains numerous exhibits. American's exhibit 32, received by the trial court, is a

letter written on March 24, 1983. In it,
American's representative at the closing
sent Jensen a list of conditions to be fulfilled prior to closing. Condition number 6
requires, "You must have in your possession the Subordination Agreement signed
by Mast Construction Co. Inc." American's exhibit 33, also received, is that
agreement in which Mast Construction
Company subordinated to American a specific sum until the occurrence of certain
events set forth in the document. The
agreement was dated March 28, 1983, the
day of closing, and was signed by American's representative and by Ron Mast in
his capacity as president of Mast Construction Company. The legal description of the
property on the exhibit attached to the
subordination agreement is the same as
that depicted on the exhibit to the deed of
trust. At trial, American's representative
testified the subordination agreement had
been executed by the time of closing because of a notation on exhibit 32 followed
by his initials.
In view of the above, we find that Ron
Mast had actual notice of the deed of trust
at issue prior to April 6, 1983, the date on
which he relies to establish the priority of
his lien. As a consequence of his actual
notice, the deed of trust is valid and binding as to Ron Mast and Mast Construction
Company.
Because of the above, it is unnecessary
to analyze whether Hammons' placement
of electrical equipment at the building site
constituted commencement to do work for
the purpose of satisfying the mechanics'
lien statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-1 to
-26 (1974). The validity of the April 6,
1983 lien date is immaterial once the priority of American's deed of trust is established as to appellants.
The judgment of the court below that
American's deed of trust was valid and had
priority over all other liens is affirmed.
Costs against appellants.
BENCH, J., concurs.
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JACKSON, Judge (concurring in
result only):
Without addressing whether the April 8
trust deed from Oakhills' general partner
to American was legally effective to create
a lien, the majority has determined that it
was "valid and binding" on Ron Mast and
his company. The majority examines the
record evidence and makes a factual finding that was not made by the trial court,
namely, that Mast had actual notice of the
April 8 trust deed. This actual notice
arises solely from the fact that, on March
28, Mast signed a subordination agreement
that clearly informed him that American
was loaning money to Oakhills for the condominium construction project on which
Mast Construction Company and other lien
claimants eventually worked. That agreement, however, does not mention anything
about an existing or planned trust deed on
the project site from Oakhills to American
as security for the construction loan. I fail
to see how it proves that Mast had actual
notice of a deed of trust that was not even
executed until after the subordination
agreement was signed.
I am concerned that, under the majority's
reasoning, no person who supplies material
or labor on a construction job bigger than a
child's sandbox will ever be able to achieve
lien priority over an entity that loans money on the project. Every materialman on
any job big enough to look like it requires
financing will be charged with knowing or
having reason to know that, at some unknown future time, the lender will require
the borrower to execute a deed of trust to
secure a loan. This result undermines the
purpose of the mechanics' lien statute,
which is "to protect those who have added
directly to the value of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon
it." Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah
2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959) (quoted with approval in First of Denver Mortg.
Inv v. CN. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d
521, 524-25 (1979)). The majority's decision requires the materialman to become a
fortune teller, thereby opening Pandora's
box in cases where predictability is needed.

Furthermore, I do not believe that a third
party's "actual notice" can turn an invalid
legal instrument into one that creates a
valid lien superior to the mechanic's lien of
the third party. In other words, if an J
instrument of conveyance is defective in
some material way, such that it is ineffective to create an encumbrance on the subject property notwithstanding its recording,
how can it be legally effective as a superior
lien as against a supplier of materials or
labor, even one who knows (or could guess)
that it is in existence? Significantly, the
statute relied upon by the majority, Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), makes an instrument valid and binding against a third
party with actual notice even though it is
"without such acknowledgment, certification or recording]" as the statutes require.
The statute does not make an instrument
with other material defects, such as those
alleged in this case, valid and binding
against either a part}' to the legally defective instrument or a third party with actual
notice of it.
Like the trial court, I believe the relevant
issues are: (1) was the trust deed, as recorded on April 8, legally effective to create a lien, with the result that its recording
on April 8 gave constructive notice to the
world of American's lien from that date?
and (2) if so, did work commence on the
site, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5
(1988), prior to April 8?
I agree with the trial court that the alleged defects and omissions in the April 8
trust deed did not deprive it of legal validity or recordability and that one lien claimant's placement of a temporary power panel and coil of wire at the project construction site on April 6, on the ground next to a
pile of trash, would not impart sufficient
notice that the materialman's work had
commenced. See Western Mortg. Loan
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967); Tripp v.
Vaughn, 141 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah App.
1987). I therefore join in the affirmance of
the judgment of the trial court.
(O
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JACKSON, Judge (concurring in
result only):
Without addressing whether the April 8
trust deed from Oakhills' general partner
to American was legally effective to create
a lien, the majority has determined that it
was "valid and binding" on Ron Mast and
his company. The majority examines the
record evidence and makes a factual finding that was not made by the trial court,
namely, that Mast had actual notice of the
April 8 trust deed. This actual notice
arises solely from the fact that, on March
28, Mast signed a subordination agreement
that clearly informed him that American
was loaning money to Oakhills for the condominium construction project on which
Mast Construction Company and other lien
claimants eventually worked. That agreement, however, does not mention anything
about an existing or planned trust deed on
the project site from Oakhills to American
as security for the construction loan. I fail
to see how it proves that Mast had actual
notice of a deed of trust that was not even
executed until after the subordination
agreement was signed.
I am concerned that, under the majority's
reasoning, no person who supplies material
or labor on a construction job bigger than a
child's sandbox will ever be able to achieve
lien priority over an entity that loans money on the project. Every materialman on
any job big enough to look like it requires
financing will be charged with knowing or
having reason to know that, at some unknown future time, the lender will require
the borrower to execute a deed of trust to
sec^Te a \oan. This result undermines the
purpose of the mechanics' lien statute,
which is "to protect those who have added
directly to the value of property by performing labor or furnishing materials upon
it." Stanton Transp. Co. v. Davis, 9 Utah
2d 184, 187, 341 P.2d 207, 209 (1959) (quoted with approval in First of Denver Mortg.
Inv. v. C.N. Zundel & Assocs., 600 P.2d
521, 524-25 (1979)). The majority's decision requires the materialman to become a
fortune teller, thereby opening Pandora's
box in cases where predictability is needed.

Furthermore, 1 do not believe that a third
party's "actual notice" can turn an invalid
legal instrument into one that creates a
valid lien superior to the mechanic's lien of
the third party. In other words, if an
instrument of conveyance is defective in
Borne material way, such that it is ineffective to create an encumbrance on the subject property notwithstanding its recording,
how can it be legally effective as a superior
lien as against a supplier of materials or
labor, even one who knows (or could guess)
that it is in existence? Significantly, the
statute relied upon by the majority, Utah
Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1986), makes an instrument valid and binding against a third
party with actual notice even though it is
"without such acknowledgment, certification or recording]" as the statutes require.
The statute does not make an instrument
with other material defects, such as those
alleged in this case, valid and binding
against either a party to the legally defective instrument or a third party with actual
notice of it.
Like the trial court, I believe the relevant
issues are: (1) was the trust deed, as recorded on April 8, legally effective to create a lien, with the result that its recording
on April 8 gave constructive notice to the
world of American's lien from that date?
and (2) if so, did work commence on the
site, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-5
(1988), prior to April 8?
I agree with the trial court that the alleged defects and omissions in the April 8
trust deed did not deprive it of legal validity or recordability and that one lien claimant's placement of a temporary power panel and coil of wire at the project construction site on April 6, on the ground next to a
pile of trash, would not impart sufficient
notice that the materialman's work had
commenced. See Western Mortg. Loan
Corp. v. Cottonwood Constr. Co., 18 Utah
2d 409, 424 P.2d 437, 439 (1967); Tripp v.
Vaughn, 747 P.2d 1051, 1055 (Utah App.
1987). 1 therefore join in the affirmance of
the judgment of the trial court.
(O \ll\
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IN T H E
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, a
Colorado corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, a
Utah corporation; Ron Mast, as assignee of
the rights of Intermountain Glass and Paint
Company, a Utah corporation; United Pacific
Reliance Insurance Company, a Washington
corporation; and Oak-hills Condominium
Limited Partnership, a Utah limited
partnership,
Defendants and Appellants.
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, a
Utah corporation,
Cross-claim Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mast Construction Company, a Utah
corporation; United Pacific Reliance Insurance
Company, a Washington corporation; and
Oakhills Condominium Limited Partnership, a
Utah limited partnership,
Cross-claim Defendants and Appellant.
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass and Paint Company, a
Utah corporation,
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
State Savings & Loan Association; Utah State
Tax Commission; Robert P. Hansen; Capitol
Glass & Aluminum; Ron Mast, as assignee of
the rights of Debenham Electrical Supply Co.;
Electro Technical Corp.; Ron Mast, as
assignee of the rights of Marathon Steel
Company; Edwards & Daniels Associates,
Inc.; John Brown & Associates; and John and
Jane Does 1 thru 100,
Third-party Defendants and Appellants.
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of
Marathon Steel Company, an Arizona
corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Mast Construction Company, a Utah
corporation; Oakhills Condominium Limited
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership; and
United Pacific Reliance Insurance Company, a
Washington corporation.
Defendants and Appellant.

Mast Construction Company, a Utah
corporation,
Third-party Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Pacific Western Industries, Inc., a Utah
corporation; Oakhills Condominium Limited
Partnership, a Utah limited partnership: and
Edwards & Daniels Associates, Inc.,
Third-party Defendants.
American Savings & Loan Association, a
California corporation, formerly State Savings
& Loan Association,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
Oakhills Partnership, a Utah limited
partnership; Pacific Western of Utah, Inc., a
Utah corporation, formerly Pacific Western
Industries, Inc., a Utah corporation; Charles
W. Akerlow; Richard J. Anderson; State Tax
Commission of Utah; Robert P. Hansen;
Capitol Glass and Aluminum Corporation, a
Utah corporation; Ron Mast, as assignee of
the rights of Debenham Electric Supply
Company, Inc., an Alaska corporation;
Electro Technical Corp., a Utah corporation;
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of
Intermountain Glass & Paint Co., a Utah
corporation; General Glass Corp., a Colorado
corporation; Ron Mast, as assignee of tin*
rights of Marathon Steel Co., an Arizona
corporation; Edwards & Daniels Associates,
Inc., a Utah corporation; Ogden's Carpel
Outlet, a Utah corporation; Mast Construction
Co., a Utah corporation; Mildred S.
Freymuller; and John Does 1 thru 30,
Defendants and Appellants.
Ron Mast, as assignee of the rights of
Debenham Electric Supply Company,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Electro Technical Corporation; Mast
Construction Company; the Oakhills
Partnership; and United Pacific Insurance
Company,
Defendants and Appellants.
Before Judges Davidson, Bench, and Jackson.
No. 860355-CA
FILED: December 15, 1988
THIRD DISTRICT
Honorable Timothy Hansen

~

ATTORNEYS:
Ronald C. Barker for Mast & Mast Con*t.
David W. Slaughter for United Pacific
Reliance.
Warren Patten, W. Cullen Battle, Douglas B.
Cannon for American Savings.
Jeffery B. Brown for Electrical Technical
Corp. & Capital Glass.
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left blank. The trust deed was executed by the
R. Stephen Marshall for Edwards & Daniels.
Oakhills
Partnership and signed by Charles
.Paul R. Howell for United Pacific Insurance.
Ackerlow and Richard Anderson on behalf of
John C Green, III for Electro Technical.
its general partner.
Leland S. McCullough, Jr. for Freymuller.
These competing actions were commenced
Pacific Western of Utah & Oakhills
after default on the note. On motions for
summary judgment, the trial court ruled that
Partnership c/o Charles Ackerlow.
the
trust deed, as recorded on April 8, 1983,
Richard Anderson.
was operative as either a trust deed or mortJames E. Boevers for Western State Title.
gage, even though it contained the aforemenDavid Black, Stephen Marshall for Edwards & tioned blanks. The court reserved the following issues for trial: (1) whether the execution
Daniels.
of the instrument was acknowledged before a
Robert F. Babcock.
notary public and, if not, what effect failure
Barbara W. Richman.
to acknowledge would have; (2) whether work
commenced prior to April 8, 1983; and (3)
OPINION ON REHEARING
whether the claimed activities of the subcontJACKSON, Judge:
ractor, Electro Technical Corporation, could
These consolidated actions were brought to constitute commencement of work under the
establish priority of the parties' interests in mechanics' lien statute, Utah Code Ann. §38real property that was the site of the Oakhills 1-5(1988).
At trial, Mast Construction Company, the
Condominium project. Due to various assignments and substitutions, Ron Mast and Mast general contractor, claimed work on the
Construction Company (referred to collectively project began under the mechanics' lien statas "Mast" are the appellants and American utes prior to April 8, 1983. Relying on the
Savings & Loan Association ("American") is trial testimony of David Hammons, president
the respondent. Mast appeals from the judg- of Electro Technical Corporation, that he
ment below that American's deed of trust placed certain electrical materials at the
constitutes a valid lien against the Oakhills project site on April 6, 1983, appellants asseCondominiums property, with priority over rted their mechanics' liens should relate back
to Hammons's date and take priority over
Mast's mechanics' liens. We affirm.1
On March 28, 1983, Oakhills Partnership American's deed of trust.
The trial court found: the trust deed was
("Oakhills") executed a promissory note to
State Savings & Loan Association (the former signed by duly authorized officers of the.
name of respondent American) for general partner in the presence of a notary
$10,400,000, the sum loaned for construction public, who completed the certificate of ackof the Oakhills Condominium project, with nowledgment but did not place the signatories
interest payable monthly from April 1, 1983, under oath as stated in the certificate; and the
and the principal due on May 1, 1985. On notary public was personally acquainted with
April 8, 1983, a document entitled the signers and familiar with their respective
"Multifamily Deed of Trust, Assignment of authorizations from and business relationships
Rents and Security Agreement (Security for with Oakhills and its general partner. In addConstruction Loan Agreement)" and dated ition, the trial court specifically found no
March 28, 1983, was filed for recording in Salt work commenced and no materials were furLake County. The document showed Oakhills, nished at the Oakhills Condominiums site
a Utah limited partnership, as "Trustor/ prior to April 8, 1983.
Based on these findings, the court conclGrantor" and "Borrower" and State Savings <&
Loan Association as "Beneficiary" and uded: (1) the trust deed acknowledgment was
"Lender." The recitals state that Borrower, in regular on its face and conformed to the staconsideration of the indebtedness recited and tutory format; (2) the trust deed was entitled
the trust created, grants, conveys and assigns to be recorded and imparted constructive
to Trustee, in trust and with power of sale, the notice to all parties of American's lien; and
described Oakhills Condominium project (3) American's lien had priority over all other
property. The document recites that it is exe- subsequent liens against the Oakhills Condocuted for the purposes of, among other things, miniums property.
On appeal, we must determine whether
repayment of the indebtedness evidenced by
Borrower's note and performance of the alleged defects and omissions in American's
covenants and agreements of Borrower cont- deed of trust, as recorded on April 8, 1983,
ained in a Construction Loan Agreement, were fatal to the creation of a lien or encumincorporated by reference. However, blanks in brance on the property or to the recordability
the deed of trust form for the trustee's name of the instrument. If not, we must then decide
and for the date, amount, and due date of the whether the court clearly erred in finding that,
note were not filled in; the space for the date for purposes of applying Utah Code Ann.
of the Construction Loan Agreement was also §38-1-5 (1988), no materials were furnished and no work commenced on the project
UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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prior to recordation of American's deed of
trust.
First, we examine the purpose and hybrid
nature of a trust deed under Utah statutes.
"'Trust deed' means a deed executed in conformity with this act and conveying real property to a trustee in trust to secure the performance of an obligation of the grantor or
other person named in the deed to a beneficiary/ Utah Code Ann. §57-1-19(3) (1986).
Although a trust deed, like a mortgage, is
given as security for the performance of some
obligation, it is nevertheless a conveyance by
which title to the trust property passes to the
trustee. See Utah Code Ann. §57-1-19(4)
(1986) ("trustee" is person to whom title to
real property is conveyed by trust deed); see
also Utah Code Ann. §57-1-28 (1986).
As a general rule, an instrument purporting
to be a deed and in which a blank has been
left for the name of the grantee is no deed and
is inoperative as a conveyance of legal title as
long as the blank remains. Burnham v.
Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P.2d 96 (1949).
Thus, the document recorded by American on
April 8, 1983, is ineffective as a titleconveying instrument because it does not identify or name the trustee, who is the grantee
under the deed.2 We nonetheless agree with
the trial court's alternative conclusion that the
instrument recorded is operative as a mortgage
despite this omission.
Unlike a trust deed, a mortgage in Utah is
not a title-conveying instrument. The mortgagor retains legal title, and the mortgagee's
interest is a lien on the property to secure
payment of a debt. State Bank of Lehi v.
Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413 (Utah 1977). See Utah
Code Ann. §78-40-8 (1987); Bybee v.
Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948). In
order to establish a valid mortgage (or trust
deed), there must be in existence a legal debt
or obligation with a specific amount owing,
Bangerter v. Poulton, 663 P.2d 100 (Utah
1983), but there is nothing in our statutes
which requires an instrument to specify the
amount of indebtedness in order to be valid as
a legal mortgage. Although Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-14 (1986) sets forth a land mortgage
form that may be used which includes spaces
for insertion of the amount and terms of the
debt, no particular form is necessary as long
as the writing shows the intention of the
parties to create a valid legal mortgage. See
Bybee, 189 P.2d at 122. The instrument need
not show the amount of indebtedness as long
as it sufficiently discloses the sources from
which the specific amount may be ascertained.
Hampshire Nat'l Bank v. Calkins, 3 Mass.
App. Ct. 697, 339 N.E.2d 244 (1975); Sease v.
John Smith Grain Co., 17 Ohio App. 3d 223,
479 N.E.2d 284, 290 (1984). See Commercial
Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggcner, 684
P.2d 261 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
Here, the clear intention of the parties that
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American be given an interest in the described
project property to secure repayment of its
loan to Oakhills appears repeatedly on the
face of the document. The parties are identified and repeatedly referred to as "borrower"
and "lender." Notwithstanding the omission of
the amount and terms of the underlying note,
the instrument recites numerous times that it is
being executed precisely to secure repayment
of Oakhills's indebtedness to American for a
specific construction loan, evidenced by a
promissory note. The instrument is thus a
valid legal mortgage giving American a lien
against the project property as security for
repayment of the construction loan.
Mast next contends American's instrument
was not entitled to be recorded under Utah
Code A n n . §57-3-1 (1986)3 because
"acknowledgment" of the instrument, required
by Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986),' necessitates a statement by the signers under oath.
As an unrecordable instrument, Mast maintains, it could not impart the notice to third
parties provided for in section 57-1-6 and
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1986)5 even
though it was, in fact, recorded. See Norton v.
Fuller, 68 Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926) (actual
recording of purported mortgage of no legal
effect where acknowledgment of execution
improperly taken by mortgagee as notary).
Appellants' principal arguments are: (1)
Ackerlow and Anderson did not sign the instrument in front of the notary public; and (2)
the acknowledgment by the signers is defective
because, as the trial court found, they were
not placed under oath by the notary.
Mast overlooks the specific finding of the
trial court that the instrument was signed in
the notary's presence, choosing instead to
reargue the contradictory testimony on this
point in the light most favorable to appellants' position. We must begin our analysis,
however, with the trial court's findings, not
with appellants' view of what facts should
have been found. As/iron v. Ashton, 733 P.2d
147, 150 (Utah 1987). As we have said on
numerous occasions, in order to challenge a
finding of fact, it is an appellant's burden to
marshall all the evidence that supports the
court's finding and then demonstrate why,
even viewing it in the light most favorable to
the court below, it is insufficient to support
the finding made. E.g., Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301, 304 (Utah Ct. App. 1987);
Harker v. Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc.,
740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)
(following Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d
1068, 1070 (Utah 1985)). Only then can we
consider whether those findings are "clearly
erroneous" under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure. Ashton, 733 P.2d at 150.
In light of Mast's failure to carry this burden
on appeal, we will not disturb the trial court's
finding. See id.; Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745
P.2d 1276,1278 (Utah 1987).
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Mast also claims the instrument was not
properly acknowledged because the notary
public did not require the signers "to take an
oath, affirm or swear in connection with the
signing" of it. Mast incorrectly cites "R. S.
McKnight v. State Land Board0 and asserts
that case "sets forth the four requirements
need [sic] for a valid notarization: (1) an oath
or solemn declaration; (2) a manifestation of
an intent to be bound by a statement or act,
but something more than just signing the
document; (3) the signature; and (4) an acknowledgment by an authorized person that the
oath was taken." (Emphasis added.) Mast then
argues that the acknowledgment on American's instrument is invalid because requirements (1) and (2) were not satisfied. Mast has,
however, grossly mischaracterized the facts
and holding in McKnight in order to make it
appear controlling in this case.
McKnight involved the filing of applications
for oil and gas leases under statutes that required applicants to be citizens or corporations
of the United States and stated lease applications must be accompanied by a "statement
under oath over applicant's signature of his
qualifications ...." McKnight v. State Land
Board, 14 Utah 2d 238, 381 P.2d 726, 730
(1963). Plaintiff argued another's application
must lose priority because it omitted an oath
of citizenship when filed. After discussing
several types of oaths and their purposes,6 the
court stated, "The essentials of an oath are: 1.
A solemn declaration. 2. Manifestation of an
intent to be bound by the statement. 3. Signature of declarer. 4. Acknowledgment by an
authorized person that oath was taken."
McK/2ig/2f,381P.2dat734.
In contrast to the statute in McKnight, the
acknowledgement statutes governing conveyances of interests in land in the spring of 1983
did not require any statement under oath by
the representatives of Oakhills Partnership
about their execution of the instrument we
have determined is a legal mortgage.7 Conveyances in writing were to be "acknowledged or
proved" and certified in the manner provided
by the statutes. Utah Code Ann. §57-2-1
(1986). See also Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6
(1986) (in order to operate as notice to third
parties, instrument "shall be proved or acknowledged and certified ....").
A person acknowledging the execution of an
instrument appears before an authorized
officer and in some manner admits the fact of
execution, with a view to giving the instrument
authenticity. See 1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledgments §29 (1962). Under our statutes, the
acknowledgment or proof could be taken by
one of several officers, including a notary
public, Utah Code Ann. §57-2-2 (1986),
who was then required to make a certificate
thereof and endorse it on or annex it to the
instrument of conveyance. Utah Code Ann.
§57-2-5 (1986). Where the person making
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the acknowledgment was personally known to
the officer to be the person whose name was
subscribed to the conveyance, no sworn oath
or affirmation of a third party regarding the
identity of the acknowledging person was
necessary. See Utah Code Ann. §§57-2-6,8 (1986). In such a case, the officer's certificate of acknowledgment was permitted to be
in substantially the following form:
State of Utah, County of
On the day of
, 19 , personally appeared before me
, the
signer of the above instrument, who
duly acknowledged to me that he
executed the same.
Utah Code Ann. §57-2-7 (1986).* The
statutory' form does not require the certificate
to state affirmatively that the person making
the acknowledgment is personally known to
the officer. Cf. In re New Concept Realty &
Dev.t Inc., 107 Idaho 711, 692 P.2d '355
(1984).
The trial court found that the signers and
their relationships to Oakhills and its general
partner were personally known to the notary
public, who had taken their acknowledgments
many times. The notary's certificate of acknowledgment recites that the two named
signers appeared before him and stated their
positions in Oakhills Partnership's general
partner, their authority to sign the document
on behalf of the limited partnership and for
the general partner, and the fact that they
acknowledged the execution of the instrument
by the limited partnership.
The certificate thus complies with the stat
utory requirements and wras sufficient tc
require acceptance of the instrument for rec
ording under Utah Code Ann. §57-3(1986). As a properly acknowledged and rec
orded mortgage, the instrument imparte<
notice of its contents to third parties as of th
recording date, April 8, 1983.9 See Utah Cod
Ann. §57-1-6 (1986); Utah Code Ann
§57-3-2(1986).
We now examine the issue of priorit
between Mast's mechanics' liens and Amei
ican's mortgage lien. Utah Code Ann. §3$
1-3 (1988) specifies the circumstances i
which those persons rendering services, per
orming labor, or furnishing materials i
certain construction projects are given mecl
anics' liens on the construction property. ]
determining the priority among competir
liens against the same property, anoth
section of the statute makes clear that the da
of recording a notice of a mechanics' lie
prescribed by Utah Code Ann. §38-1
(1988), is not conclusive. Instead, the mech
nics' liens
shall relate back to, and take effect
as of, the time of the commencement to do work or furnish mater-
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ials on the ground for the structure
or improvement, and shall have
priority over any lien, mortgage or
other encumbrance which may have
attached subsequently to the time
when the building, improvement or
structure was commenced, work
begun, or first material furnished
on the ground; also over any lien,
mortgage or other encumbrance of
which the lien holder had no notice
and which was unrecorded at the
time the building, structure or
improvement was commenced, work
begun, or first material furnished
on the ground.
Utah Code Ann. §38-1-5 (1988). Under
this provision, a properly recorded mortgage
has priority over a mechanics' lien arising
from the furnishing of labor or materials that
commenced after the mortgage recordation. See
Utah Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham,
12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P.2d 598, 602 (1961).
Mast asserted at trial that work commenced
on the Oakhills Condominium project on
April 6, 1983, two days before the recording
of American's instrument. Hammons, president of Electro Technical Corporation, testified he placed a temporary power panel and
pole, a coil of electrical wire, and some
conduit at the building site on April 6. Ron
Mast and Roger Mast claimed to have seen
these materials when visiting the project site
on or about April 8, 1983. The trial court,
however, obviously disbelieved the witnesses'
testimony, entering a specific finding that
"[n]o work commenced and no materials were
furnished at the Oakhills site prior to April 8,
1983/
Once again, appellants are attempting to
challenge this finding by rearguing the evidence. See Ashton, 733 P.2d at 150. Under the
"clearly erroneous" standard of review, we
must give due regard to the trial court's
opportunity to judge the credibility of the
witnesses. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). We cannot
set aside a trial court's finding of fact unless
it is against the clear weight of the evidence or
we otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Western
Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376, 1377
(Utah 1987). Mast has not demonstrated either
to us.
Hammons testified he placed the temporary
power panel at the top of the project site
behind a pile of debris. Roger Mast, however,
testified the panel was in a clear spot-not
near any debris-considerably to the left of
where Hammons said he placed it. Hammons
filed a notice of lien stating Electro Technical
Corporation's work on the project began May
6, 1983, which is the same date its written
subcontract with Mast Construction Company
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was signed. Electro Technical Corporation's
first application for payment identified May 9,
1983, as the first day of the project work
period. Mast Construction Company filed a
notice of lien signed by its president, Ron
Mast, giving April 28, 1983, as the date work
commenced on the project. In its April 1986
response to interrogatories, Mast Construction
Company identified April 18, 1983, as the date
work commenced, and described that work as
clearing the site, with no mention of any
temporary power equipment being left there
earlier. Finally, photographs of the work site
taken during the second half of April 1983
revealed no panel. Commenting on the inconsistent evidence, the trial court observed:
I also note with some interest that
this power pole seems to evade
having its picture taken, and it
always seems to be just outside the
range of the photographs. There is
some substantial confusion on the
part of the lien claimants as to
where this power pole was placed.
If it was placed as Mr. Hammons
said, it's to the left side of the pile
of [refuse]. And Mr. Mast as I
recall testified it was on the righthand side. And that's all shown in
the grading plan that was marked as
an exhibit and received. I'm surprised it didn't get photographed one
way or another.
The lower court thus questioned the credibility of the mechanics' lien claimants' selfserving testimony and weighed it against their
prior inconsistent actions and written statements. It is not our function to second-guess
the trial court as factfinder where there is a
dispute in the evidence. The finding that no
work was begun on or materials furnished to
the project before the recording of American's
mortgage on April 8, 1983, is not clearly erroneous. 10 The trial court correctly concluded
that American's lien took priority over all
other liens subsequent to that date.
We have considered the other issues raised
by appellants and find them equally meritless.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge
Russell W. Bench, Judge
1. We previously issued an opinion in this case affirming the judgment of the trial court on a different
basis. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co., 758
P.2d 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Mast's subsequent
petition for rehearing was granted and the case was
resubmitted for decision. The prior opinion was
withdrawn by order of this court dated September
13, 1988. General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr. Co.,
91 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Ct. App. 1988).
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2. In addition, Utah Code Ann. §57-3-10(2)
(1986) rendered the document unentitled to recording as a trust deed because it omits the name and
address of the trustee/grantee.
3.
A certificate of the acknowledgment
of any conveyance, or of the proof of
the execution thereof as provided in this
title, signed and certified by the officer
taking the same as provided in this title,
shall entitle such conveyance, with the
certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be
recorded in the office of the recorder of
the county in which the real estate is
situated.
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-1 (1986). The term
•conveyance" as used in Title 57 embraced "ever)'
instrument in writing by which any real estate, or
interest in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged,
encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for
a term not exceeding one year." Utah Code Ann.
§57-1-1 (1986).
4.
Every conveyance of real estate, and
every instrument of writing setting forth
an agreement to convey any real estate
or whereby any real estate may be affected, to operate as notice to third
persons shall be proved or acknowledged
and certified in the manner prescribed
by this title and recorded in the office of
the recorder of the county in which such
real estate is situated ....
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986) (repealed by
Utah Laws 1988, ch. 155, §24; now see Utah Code
Ann. §57-3-2 (1988)).
5.
(1) Every conveyance, or instrument in
writing affecting real estate, executed,
acknowledged, or proved, and certified,
in the manner prescribed by this title ...
shall, from the time of filing the same
with the recorder for record, impart
notice to all persons of their content.
Subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and
lien holders are deemed to purchase and
take with notice..
Utah Code Ann. §57-3-2(1) (1986) (1985 amendments were stylistic only).
6.
The purpose of an oath is to avoid a
violation of a pledge or promise. It is to
become secure against profanation or
corruption, or breach. In its broadest
form the term "oath" is used to include
all forms of attestation by which one
signifies that he is bound in good faith
to perform what is demanded by the
oath faithfully and truly. It does not
include those forms of the attestation
which are not accompanied by an imprecation.
Mcknight, 381 P.2d at 733-34.
7. The instrument in this case was executed by a
partnership. The certificate of acknowledgment of
an instrument executed by a corporation, however,
was required to be substantially in the statutory
form found in the second part of Utah Code Ann.
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§57-2-7 (1986), which specifically refers to the
person executing the document as swearing or affirming to his or her corporate officer or agent status
and to the source of authorization to sign the instrument on the corporation's behalf. The acknowledgment statutes, Utah Code Ann. §§57-2-1
through-9 (1986) were recently repealed by Utah
Laws 1988, ch. 155, §24 (effective July 1, 1988).
The current comparable provisions can be found at
Utah Code Ann. §§57*2a-l through-7 (1988).
8. The substance of what it means to acknowledge
execution of a document before a notary or othei
authorized officer in particular circumstances, sucb
as on behalf of a partnership or corporation, is no\*
set forth in Utah Code Ann. §57-2a-2(l) (1988).
9. We reject appellants' assertion, supported onlj
by superficial legal analysis, that omission of thi
amount and date of the note rendered the instru
ment recorded "void" because it could not impar
constructive notice of American's mortgage liei
under Utah Code Ann. §57-1-6 (1986) and Utal
Code Ann. §57-3-2 (1986). The clear reference
in the mortgage to the separate note and construe
tion loan agreement, along with the names an
addresses of Oakhills and American, were adequat
to put prudent subsequent lienors on inquiry notic
which, if pursued, would lead to actual notice of th
amount and terms of the indebtedness. See Johnsc
v. Bell 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983). See also Comn
ercial Factors of Denver v. Clarke & Waggcner, 61
P.2d 261, 263 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984); Air Flo
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc. v. Baker, V*
So.2d 449, 451 (Fla. Ct. App. 1976), cert, deme
341 So.2d 289 (Fla. 1976).
10. In light of this determination, we do not rea<
the issues of whether placement of this tempora
power equipment at the project site would be lie
able work under section 38-1-3 and, if s
whether it would have provided sufficient notice
constitute the "commencement of work" und
section 38-1-5.
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2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692
Telephone (801)486-9636
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
GENERAL GLASS CORPORATION, a
Colorado corporation, et al.,
ORDER EXTENDING
TIME TO PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI

Plaintiffs and Respondentsf
vs.
MAST CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
et al.,

DOCKET NUMBER
Court of Appeals Docket No.
860355-CA

Defendants and Appellants,
and Petitioners for
Writ of Certiorari.
The

Court

having

considered

the

foregoing

ex

parte

motion, and good cause appearing therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Ron Mast and Mast Construction Company
shall have through February 2, 1989 within which to petition
this Court for a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
in this matter.
So ordered this seventeenth day of January, 1989.

BY THE COURT
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APPENDIX V

Trial Proceedings of June 1986, pages 74-81 and 95-96

1

adverse party.

2
3

Theyfve also called him as their

MR. STRONG:
witness.

4
5

We have sued him.

THE COURT:
an adverse party.

6

That doesn't solve the problem.

He may lead.

MR. BARKER:

He's

Objection overruled.

I object that it asks for a

7

conclusion of the witness.

8

specific affidavit, or a specific transaction, or event, he

9

should do so.

10

MR. PATTEN:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE WITNESS:

If he wants to ask about a

I asked about the closing.
Objection overruled.
No.

I don't think that!s fair.

I

13

have some very specific recollections of what took place on

14

March 28th when we were asked to sign documents by American

15

Savings.

16

Q

(By Mr. Patten)

17

A

My memory is that t h e —

18

MR. STRONG:

And your memory is what, sir?

Excuse me, Your Honor.

19

object to the form of that question.

20

specifically asked about his memory.

I'm going to

I don't think he

21

MR. PATTEN:

I'll rephrase it, sir.

22

MR. BARKER:

I suggest we have a foundation.

23

THE COURT:

24
25

Q

That's what he's going to do.

(By Mr. Patten)

Where do you recall signing

Exhibit P-l, sir?
74

M

A

In my office.

2

Q

In whose presence?

3

A

In the presence of Mr. Anderson.

4

Q

Do you recall whether or not Mr. Anderson signed

5

the document at the same time in your office?

6

A

It's my recollection that he did.

7

Q

Do you recall attending a closing at the office of

8

Western States SAvings—Western States Title?

9

A

Not on this transaction, no.

10

Q

Is it that you have no memory either way, or that

n
12

you have a memory that in fact you did not?
A

My memory is that on this closing, we did not go

13 to Western Title.
n

Q

We went to one a few months later.

Do you recall, sir, whether you ever appeared

15 before Mr. Jensen to acknowledge to him, or tell him that
16 you in fact had signed Exhibit P-l?
17
18

A

No.

I did not do that.

MR. PATTEN:

Your Honor, if it hasn't been done

19 before, I move that the deposition of Mr. Akerlow taken on
20

May 1, 1986 be published at this time.

21

MR. BARKER:

22

THE COURT:

23

No objection.
Any objection to publishing the*

deposition of Mr. Akerlow?

24

MR. STRONG:

25 J

MR. GREEN:

No, Your Honor.
No objection.
75

THE WITNESS:

This would be my second deposition,

MR. PATTEN:

I believe thatfs correct.

MR. STRONG:

The third, I think, actually.

THE COURT:

This is the deposition taken on

May 1st, '86.

Is this the one you'd like to have

published?
MR. PATTEN:
3 I
9

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.
There being no objection, the Court

will publish the deposition of Mr. AJcerlow of that date.

0

MR. PATTEN:

Your Honor, I would like to read,

1 beginning on page 10, line 25.
2

THE COURT:

3 can follow along.
4

The record will show that Mr. Akerlow

has signed that.

5
6

Let me hand this to Mr. Akerlow so he

THE WITNESS:
J

Q

Thank you, Your Honor.

(By Mr. Patten)

"Question:

Did you ever appear

before Jeff Jensen and swear that this was, in fact, your
8

I signature on page 8 of this Trust Deed?

9

I

"Answer:

o
1

I donft recall whether I did or not.

"Question:
I

"Answer:

2 {

You have no specific recollection?
No."

That was indeed your testimony at that time, was

3 I it not?
4
5

A
j

Yes.
MR. PATTEN:

I have nothing further at this time,
76

1

Your Honor.

2

T H E COURT:

3 gentlemen.

Let's break for t h e noon r e c e s s ,

We'll c o n t i n u e with M r . A k e r l o w .

W e ' l l b e in

4

r e c e s s until 2:00 p.m., a n d hopefully at that point in time

5

I'll h a v e sufficient accommodation f o r all o f y o u .

6

b e in recess until t w o .

7

(The noon recess was taken.)

6
9

We'll

THE COURT:

The record will show we continue in

Debenham versus Electro Technical and others.

10 that a l l p a r t i e s a r e p r e s e n t .

It appears

A l l counsel a r e p r e s e n t . ,

11 M r . Strong?
12

MR- STRONG:

13

T h a n k you, Your H o n o r .
CROSS-EXAMINATION

14 BY M R . S T R O N G :
15

Q

M r . Akerlow, d o y o u remember w h o g a v e y o u t h e

16 Trust Deed t h a t ' s been marked P-l for y o u t o sign?
17

A

18

Savings.

19
20

Q

N o t specifically, n o . Someone from A m e r i c a n

D o y o u remember in r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e d a y y o u

signed t h e deed w h a t d a y that would h a v e been?

21

A

It w a s M o n d a y t h e 28th of M a r c h .

22

Q

W h e n y o u received Exhibit P-l, w e r e all o f t h e

23

spaces completed in that document?

24

A

N o f they w e r e n o t .

25 J

Q

So there were blanks, then?
77

1

A

Yes.

2

Q

W h o w a s it that asked you to sign the Exhibit P-l,

3

even though there w e r e b l a n k s in it?

4

A

I t h i n k it w a s the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from A m e r i c a n

5

savings who came over to my office.

6

this loan closed by t h e end of the m o n t h , and not all t h e

7

documentation was done.

8

received a copy of t h e commitments from A m e r i c a n S a v i n g s on

9

this particular

10

We were trying to get

And in fact, I h a d n ' t even

loan.

They brought those with them on the 28th.

It was

n i the first time I f d even seen any loan commitments.

So we

12 l had t o h a v e a d i s c u s s i o n on that.
13

The fellow I'd been dealing with was Jack

14 i recall it w a s him.

Stermer.

I w o u l d n ' t swear to it, but I t h i n k

15 J it w a s he and I that visited about that on the 28th.
16

Q

That w o u l d have been in y o u r office?

17

A

Yes.

*8

Q

You w e r e p r e s e n t in the c o u r t r o o m t h i s m o r n i n g ; is

19

that

correct?

20

A

Yes.

2i

Q

A n d you saw a m a n who identified h i m s e l f as

22

Stephen Emrick testify; is that

correct?

23

A

Yes.

24

Q

Have you ever seen Stephen Emrick before

25

A

No.

I don't b e l i e v e so.

today?

1
2

Q

Now f again, when y o u actually signed Exhibit P-l,

who else w a s present in y o u r office?

3

A

A s I recall, Richard Anderson w a s t h e r e .

4

Q

W a s there a notary present?

5

A

No.

6 J

Q

Did anyone p l a c e you under oath b e f o r e signing

7

that d o c u m e n t ?

8 !

A

No.

9

Q

A t any other t i m e , did you ever a p p e a r in front of

10 a notary p u b l i c to a c k n o w l e d g e that you had signed that?
11

A

No.

I don't b e l i e v e so.

12

Q

Now, b e f o r e w e t o o k a break for lunch, M r . Patten

13 asked y o u t h a t question, and then called to y o u r a t t e n t i o n
14 the d e p o s i t i o n that you had given some t i m e a g o — I g u e s s
15 mayb€» on M a y 1 s t — w h e r e y o u r answer seemed to be a little
16 different.

A r e you able to explain the d i f f e r e n c e in the

17 testimony t o d a y as opposed to the d e p o s i t i o n t e s t i m o n y ?
18

A

W e l l , subsequent to the deposition, the thought

19 occurred to m e that in all t h e years I've b e e n in the
20

d e v e l o p m e n t b u s i n e s s , I do not recall a t i m e that J e f f

21 Jensen h a s e v e r b e e n in my o f f i c e .

The n a t u r e ofthe

22 b u s i n e s s is I w o u l d a l w a y s go to his office if I needed to
23 go a n y w h e r e , and I remember w e once met at lunch.
24 never b e e n in my o f f i c e .

But he'd

And so I guess t h a t ' s why I

25 answered m a y b e a little m o r e strongly today t h a n I did in

i

t h e deposition, because I know I signed that document in my

2

office.

And I really don't believe J e f f h a s ever been in

3 my o f f i c e .
4

5

So I don't think I could h a v e signed it in

front of him.
Q

Now, M r . A n d e r s o n has testified in his deposition,

6

w h i c h h a s now been introduced into court, that he signed

7

the Exhibit P-l at W e s t e r n States T i t l e .

8

testified this m o r n i n g that he also appeared at Western

9

S t a t e s Title, and that Ron Mast w a s b r i e f l y at the closing.

M r . Emrick

10 Can y o u recall any other closing that y o u ' d been involved
11 in w i t h similar circumstances?
12

A

W e had a closing within a few m o n t h s after this on

13 another building, an office building downtown, that w e did
14 close at Western States Title.

And Richard and I w e r e the

15 signatories on that loan as w e l l .

And at that p a r t i c u l a r

16 closing, Ron Mast did have to come to t h e closing, as I
n
18

recall, because t h e r e w a s some documents for him to sign.
MR. PATTEN:

W e l l , Your Honor, I m o v e to strike

19 the question and answer.

It hasn't been related at all to

20 A m e r i c a n Savings & Loan.

Apparently some other totally

21 unrelated deal had nothing to do with A m e r i c a n S a v i n g s .
22

MR. STRONG:

I believe my question asked w h e t h e r

23 there w a s another closing w h e r e M r . M a s t w a s there,
24 M r . A n d e r s o n was t h e r e , and I believe A m e r i c a n S a v i n g s .
25 b e l i e v e I added they w e r e there at a n o t h e r closing, and I

I

1 think the question has been answered.
2

THE COURT:

I don't t h i n k y o u included A m e r i c a n

3 S a v i n g s in y o u r q u e s t i o n .
4
5
6

MR. STRONG:
Q

A l l right.

(By M r . Strong)

subsequent question.

Do y o u w a n t t o reask it?

W e l l , I'll really just a s k a

Y o u f v e already told u s that y o u

7 remember a time when Mr. Anderson, yourself, Mr. Jensen,
8

and briefly M r . Mast were all present.

Do you remember a

9

closing where in addition to those four entities, or

10 parties, that American Savings was also present?
11

A

N o . N o . T h e y w e r e n o t at that closing.

12 I

Q

T h a n k y o u . N o w , o n M a r c h 28th, M r . A n d e r s o n

13 a c t u a l l y e x e c u t e d E x h i b i t P-l?
14

A

Well, I thought I did.

15

Q

And what's your best recollection as to that?

16

A

M y b e s t r e c o l l e c t i o n is that in t h e m o r n i n g w e m e t

17 with, I believe it was Jack Stermer, to go over the deal,
18 which until that time we hadn't seen.

Until that time we

19 had not seen the commitment letter on either the
20
2i

construction loan, or the permanent financing.
We generally knew the terms, but the fine print,

22 we hadn't seen.

And there was a lot of fine print in there

23 that h a d n o t b e e n discussed in a l l of t h e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s
24 b e t w e e n u s .
25

We knew our loan had been approved, but we didn't

1

signed?

2

A

W e gave it all back t o American Savings, o r State

3 S a v i n g s , and understood that they would t a k e it from there
4

t o get recorded and funded.

5

Q

6

A

7

Q

8

Did you ever resign that document?
No.
Did you ever take a n oath in c o n n e c t i o n with

signing Exhibit 1?

9

A

I don't know what you mean b y take a n oath.

10

Q

D i d someone swear you t o tell the truth?

11

A

12

Q

No.
D i d someone ask you if you acknowledged that the

13 contents were true?

14

A

15

Q

16

A

17

Q

No.
D i d someone verify that the c o n t e n t s were true?
No.
Calling y o u r attention t o Exhibit 36, when did you

18 first see that document?
19
20

M R . BARKER:

T h a t ' s the opinion letter, Your

THE WITNESS:

I don't remember when I first s a w

Honor.

21
22 i t .
23

Q

(By M r . Barker)

D o you recall having seen it in

24 the p r o x i m i t y o f A p r i l , 1983, o r was it y o u r — a year o r two
25

later?

M

A

Oh, no.

No.

No.

I saw it at that t i m e — a t the

2

time of the closing, because it was our responsibility to

3

get an opinion letter over there.

4

the exact date I saw it.

5

Q

I see.

I just don't remember

Now, you indicated that you were on the

6

site with the Masts, and you were concerned about non-

7

receipt of footing drawings.

8

response to a prior question.

You mentioned that in

9

A

Yes.

10

Q

When was that?

11

A

It would have been 1 5 — 1 6 April, somewhere in

12 there,

f

83.

13

Q

Were you on the site earlier than that in April?

H

A

I don't recall.

15

MR. BARKER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. BARKER:

18

THE COURT:

M r . Green?

19

MR. GREEN:

I have no questions.

20

MR. MARSHALL:

21

THE COURT:

22

May I have a moment with my client?
Certainly.
No further questions.

Now that I've got you folks a spot, I

hope you feel like y o u 1 r e part of it.

23

MR. MARSHALL:

24

THE COURT:

25

I have no questions.

Appreciate it.

Mr. Patten?

APPENDIX VI

Bybee v. Stuart, 189 P.2d 118 (Utah 1948)
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ever, appellants contend, as I understand
their position, that in a case such as this,
the jury should have pointed out to them,
by instruction from the court, the various
elements to be considered in determining
the depreciation. Appellants went so far
in this case as to submit a request for instruction embodying their theory, and asking separate damages for claimed injuries
to each separate part of the land. Not only did the court not err in refusing this request, but it would have committed error if
it had granted it. The request was a complete departure from the well settled rule
that damages are given for depreciation in
the fair market value of the land as a
whole.
The state put on two real estate experts,
who testified that the depreciation in market
value of the remaining land was $1500 or
$1800. Both of these experts were subjected to searching cross-examinations, and
the exact bases of their opinions were clearly shown to the jury, both as to factors
considered by them in making their estimates, and as to factors unknown to or
ignored by them.

by the fact that they fixed the damages to
the remaining property at $3,000, or about
twice the amount fixed by the experts as
the depreciation value. The appellants
have shown no prejudicial error. For these
reasons, I concur.
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BYBEE et al. v. STUART.
No. 6981.

Supreme Court of Utah.
Jan. 29, 1948.
1. Appeal and error <§=>987(3)

On appeal from judgment for plaintiff
in equity action to compel conveyance of
lands to him and quiet his title thereto,
Supreme Court may review facts as well as
law.
2. Mortgages <3=>33(3)

A warranty deed, absolute in form,
was not absolute conveyance of land to
grantee, but a "mortgage," in view of parties' contemporaneous written agreement,
providing that conveyance was made to
enable grantee to obtain loan on premises
for sum to be used in paying mortgage
thereon and that, if grantor desired to sell
land, grantee would convey title to purchaser on payment to grantee of such
amount.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, for all other definitions of
"Mortgage".

As pointed out in the prevailing opinion,
restoration costs may, in some cases, be an
accurate measure of damages, i. e. of the
depreciation in market value. In other
cases restoration costs may bear no relation to the depreciation in market value.
Market value is the price at which a willing vendor would sell, and at which a willing buyer would purchase in a free and
open market. Fair market value is ordinarily proved by the testimony of experts,
who may be fully examined and cross-examined as to the factors considered by
them, and the bases upon which they de- 3. Mortgages <S=>33(I), 36
termined their appraisals.
A warranty deed, absolute in form, is
presumed
to convey fee-simple title or at
As heretofore stated, the state put on two
least whatever title grantor has to land dereal estate experts. Appellants called none.
scribed, but, where contemporaneous writAppellants put on evidence of the value of
ten agreement between parties shows that
the basement home, replacement cost, cost
deed was given for security purposes, court
of destroying the old home, value of trees,
will look to real transaction and treat it as
shrubs, fruit plants, etc. All of these
mortgage. 1
factors were prominently before the jury.
That the jury was fully aware of all these 4. Mortgages <§=?42
factors and that they took them into acAn instrument need not follow statucount in reaching their verdict is evidenced tory form to be a real estate mortgage, and
l Brown v. Skeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24.
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* particular form is necessary so long as JO. Mortgages <3=*I37
In ''"title theory" or "common law"
fOes' intention is shown, Utah Code
^ 78—1—13.
states, mortgage deed conveys legal title
to mortgagee, subject to mortgagor's equity
Mortgages <S=>33(I)
of redemption, but in "equitable" or "lien
A real estate mortgage need not be
theory" states, including Utah, legal title
"ruined in one writing, but may consist
,
,
remains in mortgagor subject to lien in
f
* warranty deed and separate written m o r t
, s f a v o n U t a h C o d e 1 9 4 3 1 0 4 __
•xtract.1
i Mortgages <§=>37(2)

. Mortgages @=M37
In equity, a deed absolute on its face
The code section providing that mort*y be shown by paroP evidence to have
^ g i v e n for security purposes only, and, S a 2 e o £ l a n d s h a I 1 h a v e e f f e c t o f convey* such showing, equity will give effect a n c e t h e r e o f t 0 mortgagee as security for
s parties' intention
payment of indebtedness set forth therein
is not necessarily inconsistent with section
'. Mortgages <S=»27
providing that real property mortgage shall
Deeds given for security purposes only, n o t be deemed a conveyance, whatever its
*amg requisites of formal mortgages, are terms, in view of section defining "convcy^nned "equitable mortgages". 2
ance" as embracing every written instruSee Words and Phrases, Permanent
ment by which any real estate or interest
Edition, for all other definitions of
therein is created, aliened, mortgaged, en"Equitable Mortgage".
cumbered, or assigned. Utah Code 1943,
78—1—1, 78—1—13, 101—57—7.
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7
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12. Deeds €=>3
At common law, term "conveyance"
meant transfer of title to or estate in land
or the instrument by which such transfer
was accomplished, but definition thereof
was broadened by statute to include also
mortgages, encumbrances, etc., and as used
in statute
respecting land mortgages, cover
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14. Frauds, statute of <3=>63(5)
One conveying land by warranty deed
as security for repayment of sum loaned
to grantee for payment of mortgage o;i
land held title thereto in fee, subject to
mortgage lien in grantee's favor, and
hence had such estate or interest in land
as could be conveyed only by written instrument. Code Utah 1943, 33—5—1.

The facts out of which this case arises
are these:
In 1936 the wife of cross-defendant Oni
Douglas Stuart died, and
defendant
(Claude Stuart) took Oni's son, David, to
live with him and his family. Oni and
Claude were brothers. Tt is fairly inferable from the record that defendant took
the boy, David, as an acknowledged family obligation, and without expectation of
recompense. There was no contract between the brothers that defendant should
receive any pay or other consideration for
performance of this duty. Oni, at all times,
paid for his son's clothing, schooling, and
other expenses. The boy, David, assisted
with the household chores around defendant's place, and apparently was treated very
much the same as defendant's own sons.

15. Mortgages <§=>608»/2
In judgment ordering grantee of land
to reconvey it to grantor as mortgagor
and quieting grantor's title thereto, court
properly ordered payment to grantee of so
much of amount paid into court by grantor in repayment of sums advanced by
grantee to preserve mortgaged property as
was advanced by grantee for water stock
assessments and general taxes thereon,
mortgage payments, etc., and remission of
The trial court found the facts substanbalance to grantor.
tially as follows:

Appeal from District Court, Second District, Weber County; Charles G. Cowley,
Judge.
Action by Byron L. Bybce, Sr., and another against Claude E. Stuart to compel
conveyance of certain lands to plaintiffs by
defendant, who filed a counterclaim against
plaintiffs and a cross-claim against Oni
Douglas Stuart and another, interpleaded
as plaintiffs and cross-defendants, to quiet
title to. the lands in defendant. From a
judgment ordering defendant to convey the
lands to plaintiffs and quieting plaintiffs'
title thereto, defendant appeals.
Affirmed.
David J. Wilson, of Ogden, for defendant and appellant.

On May 11, 1942, and for a long tiin-prior thereto, Oni Stuart owned a tract of
land in Weber County. The land was
heavily mortgaged, and the mortgages were
then in the process of foreclosure. Oni
was in straitened financial circumstances
and was about to lose his land. Oni being unable to get credit from outside
sources, his brother, the defendant, agreed
to advance the money necessary to pay off
the mortgages in order that he would not
lose his land. As security for the money
advanced, Oni executed to defendant a
warranty deed, absolute in form, to his
land. Contemporaneous with the deed, and
as part of the same transaction, the parties also had drawn the following agreement :
"Statement

"This Memorandum of Agreement witThatcher & Young, of Ogden, for plain- nesseth:
tiffs and respondents.
"That Oni Douglas Stuart has this day
Thatcher & Young, of Ogden, for inter- conveyed by warranty deed to the underpleaded plaintiffs, cross-defendants and re- signed, Claude E. Stuart, the following despondents
scribed real property * * * [description omitted]
W O L F E , Justice.
' T h e conveyance of said property was
Appeal by the defendant from a judg- made to enable the undersigned, Claude E.
ment and decree of the second district Stuart, to obtain a loan on said premises
court, ordering defendant to execute a for eleven hundred ($1100.00) Dollars, to
conveyance of certain lands to plaintiffs, be used in paying an existing mortgage
and quieting plaintiffs' title thereto.
against said property, together with de-
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"Q. Was anything said about the care
linquent taxes and certain expenses incurred in connection with adjusting fore- of the boy? A. Yes.
closure proceedings instituted against said
"Q. W h a t ? A. Hi? said; ! If you conproperty amounting1 to the .sum of approx- tinue to take care of the boy and give him
imately eleven hundred ($1100.00) Dollars. a good home until he gets of age, why,
"It is understood and agreed on the part you have the land/
of the said Claude E. Stuart that he will
"Q. Alright, what did you say? A. I
rcconvey said premises to Oni Douglas told him: I said, 'That is perfectly alright
Stuart upon the repayment to him of the with me. When the time came when the
amount of mortgage which he has executed boy was of age, if he wants the land then
against said premises, together with all in- I will give him title to the land in reimterest and other expenses, including taxes, bursement of v/hat I got in the land myself,
that said Claude E. Stuart may have in- without interest/
curred or may incur in paying off the
"Q. Was anything further said by your
mortgage executed against said premises,
brother
Oni? A. Oni said: 'That is aland any other expenses connected with
right.
W
e will let the matter stand as it
the same, said payment to be made within
is. "
years from this date.
Defendant's wife, who was present at the
"It is further agreed on the part of the
time
the conversation was supposed to have
aid Claude E. Stuart that should Oni
taken
place, was called to corroborate deDouglas Stuart desire to sell this property,
fendant's
testimony but was unable to do so.
that he, the said Claude E. Stuart, will
Oni
categorically
denied that any such conconvey to such purchaser the title to said
versation
ever
took
place.
property upon the payment to him of the
amount hereinbefore

provided.

'This agreement or understanding is to
be binding upon the heirs, successors, and
assigns of the parties hereto.
"This, the 11th day of May, A. D., 1942.
"(Signed) Claude E. Stuart"
(Italics added)
During June, 1942, Oni Stuart was ill
in the hospital. When he was well enough
to leave the hospital, he went to defendant's home to stay during his convalescence.
Defendant testified that about a week after Oni left the hospital, the two brothers
had a conversation as follows:
"A. We were sitting in the living room
and Oni turned to me and he said: 'You
have been mighty nice to me. Have me
ame and live here. I want to stay here
intil I get over my illness I got.' I said:
That is perfectly alright/ He said: 'You
;ave been good to me and good to the boy,
»nd have given the boy a good home. We
nil just let the title stay in your name,
«nd leave the title just as it is, and you
can have the use of the land, and the
atle will be yours, and the land is yours.
>
jVe will let the title stay just as it is at
|ae present time.'
18DP.2d—8^

On July 13, 1942, about two weeks after
the purported conversation above quoted,
Oni listed the land for sale with cross-defendant Cook, a real estate broker. In
September, 1944, plaintiffs contracted to
purchase the land from Oni, and he executed a deed to them in October, 1944.
When defendant learned of the deal between plaintiffs and Oni, he called upon
Cook, and claimed to be owner of the premises.
Plaintiffs commenced this action against
defendant to compel him to execute and
deliver to them a conveyance to the premises, upon receiving the amount expended
by defendant in preserving the property.
Defendant answered, and by way of counterclaim against plaintiffs and cross-claim
against Cook and Oni Stuart who were
interpleaded as "cross-defendants," asserted title in himself and prayed that title
be quieted in him.
The trial court concluded from the facts
as outlined above that plaintiffs were the
owners of the premises and entitled to immediate possession of the premises, and
rendered judgment accordingly. From that
judgment defendant prosecutes this appeal.
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[1] Defendant has assigned numerous
errors, all of which go to the correctness
of the court's construction of the original
transaction between Oni and defendant,
and the effect, if any, upon this transaction, of the subsequent oral conversation
between the two brothers. This being an
equity case, we may review the facts as
well as the law.
[2,3] The first question presented for
our determination is as to the nature of the
original transaction between the brothers
Stuart. Although it is not clear in the
briefs, it appears to be defendant's contention that the original transaction was
an absolute conveyance of the land in question to defendant. This position is without
support in fact or law. It is true, of
course, that a warranty deed, absolute in
form, is presumed to convey a fee simple
title, or at least whatever title the grantor
has. But where, as here, there is a written
agreement between the parties, contemporaneous with the deed, which shows the
deed to have been given for security purposes, the court will look to the real transaction, and treat it as a mortgage. Brown
v. Skeen, 89 Utah 568, 58 P.2d 24. The
fact that by the terms of the contract,
Oni Stuart had the right to sell the land
to a third person, clearly indicates the intention of the parties that title should not
pass to the defendant.

nings, 5 Utah 243, 251, 15 P. 65; Duerden
v. Solomon, 33 Utah 468, 94 P. 978;
Hess v. Anger, 53 Utah 186, 177 P. 232.
See also 3 Jones, Commentaries on Evidence, 2d Edition, page 2793, Section 1531.
[8] The deed and contract here show
all the requisites of a formal mortgage—a
conveyance of particular land as security
for a debt with the necessary defeasance
clause. This was not merely an equitable
mortgage—a security transaction resting
partially in parol and cognizable only in
equity. The two instruments, taken together, constitute a formal mortgage, cognizable in a court of law. Defendant did
not acquire the title to the lands under the
warranty deed. H e was merely a mortgagee.
[9]
tion:

This brings us to the second ques-

As we have heretofore noted, defendant testified to a conversation between himself and his brother Oni, by which it is
claimed Oni orally surrendered to defendant any interest he had in the property.
The court found that such a conversation
did take place, and his finding is crossassigned as error by the appellees. However, the court found that this purported
surrender was ineffectual under the Statute of Frauds—Sees. 33—5—1 and 33—
5—3, U.C.A.1943. Defendant contends that
Oni Stuart's oral surrender of his interest
[4-7] Our statute (Sec. 78—1—13 U. in the premises was valid.
C. A. 1943) furnishes a form for real esWe deem it unnecessary to pass upon
tate mortgages. However, it is not necesappellees' cross-assignment of error, since
sary that an instrument follow the statutory
we are of the opinion that even if such
form to be a mortgage. No particular
conversation took place as was testified to
form is necessary so long as the intention
by defendant, it was within the Statute of
of the parties is shown. Nor is it necesFrauds and therefore unenforceable.
sary that the mortgage be contained in one
[10] There are two rather well defined
writing—it may consist of a warranty deed
and a separate contract in writing. Brown views of mortgages in the United States.
v. Skeen, supra. See also 1 Jones on In the so-called "title-theory" or "common
Mortgages, 8th Edition, Chapter 2. And law" states, it is held that a mortgage deed
in equity a deed absolute upon its face may conveys to the mortgagee the legal title,
be shown by parol evidence to have been subject to the mortgagor's equity of regiven for security purposes only, and when demption. In the "equitable" or "lien-thesuch a showing has been made, equity will ory" states, it is held that the legal title
give effect to the intention of the parties. remains in the mortgagor subject to a lien
Such security transactions, lacking the re- in favor of the mortgagee. 1 Jones on
quisites of a formal mortgage, are termed Mortgages, Sections 12, 15-16, 18 and 67.
equitable mortgages. 1 Jones on MortgagUtah, along with most of the other westes, Chapter 5; Wasatch Min. Co. v. Jen- ern states, has long been recognized as a
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Actions 60, 67, 68. This court has reputedly said that a mortgage in this state
xs not vest title in the mortgagee, but
-•erely creates a lien in his favor. Thompson v. Cheesman, 15 Utah 43, 48 P. 477;
Donaldson v. Grant, 15 Utah 231, 49 P.
- 9 ; Azzalia v. St. Claire, 23 Utah 401, 64
?. 1106; Carlquist v. Coltharp, 67 Utah
:
:4, 248 P. 481, 47 A.L.R. 765; In re Rey^Ids' Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270.
-iese cases* are based largely on a statutory provision which appears in our 1943
Code as Sec. 104—57—7 and is as follows:
"A mortgage of real property shall not
• deemed a conveyance, whatever its
trms, so as to enable the owner of the
-engage to recover possession of the real
;*operty without a foreclosure and sale."
[11] We note here a seeming contradictor! in our statutes. Sec. 78—1—13, U.C.
U943, after setting forth the statutory
• >rm for a mortgage of land, provides as
allows:
"Such mortgage when executed as rehired by law shall Jtave the effect of a con'tyance of the land therein described, toother with all the rights, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto belonging, to the
mortgagee, his heirs, assigns and legal representatives, as security for the payment of
** indebtedness thereon set forth, with
tenants from the mortgagor of general
warranty of title, and that all taxes and
^essments levied and assessed upon the
tad described, during the continuance of
^ mortgage, will be paid previous to the
iy appointed for the sale of such lands for
ixes; and may be foreclosed as provided
y law upon any default being made in any
•i the conditions thereof as to payment of
-her principal, interest, taxes or assessments." (Italics supplied.)

Utah

1<v>

with Sec. 104—57—7. Sec. 78—1—1 is as
follows:
"The term 'conveyance* as used in this
title shall be construed to embrace every
instrument in writing by which any real
estate, or interest in real estate, is created, aliened, mortgaged, encumbered or assigned, except wills, and leases for a term
not exceeding one year."
(Italics supplied).
[12] At common law the term "conveyance" meant a transfer of title or of an estate in land, or the instrument by which
such transfer was accomplished. By the
terms of Sec. 78—1—1, the definition is
broadened to include not only the transfers
of estates or interests in land, hut also
mortgages, incumbrances, etc. As used in
Sec. 78—1—13, the term "conveyance" covers transactions not involving a transfer of
title or of an estate in land, but merely
an effective mortgage or incumbrance of
the land. However, as used in 104—57—7,
"conveyance" is used in its common law
sense—a transfer of title or an estate in the
land.
[13] We adhere to the now well established doctrine that the mortgagor retains
title to the mortgaged lands, and all that is
created in favor of the mortgagee is a lien
—a right to resort to the land to satisfy
the mortgage debt. In re Reynolds' Estate, 90 Utah 415, 62 P.2d 270.
[14] Oni Stuart therefore, as mortgagor, held the title to the premises in fee,
subject to a mortgage lien in favor of defendant, and therefore he had such an estate or interest in the land as could be
conveyed only by a written instrument under Sec. 33—5—1, U.C.A. 1943, which provides as follows:
"No estate or interest in real property,
other than leases for a term not exceeding
one year * * *, shall be
created,
granted, assigned, surrendered or declared
otherwise than by act or operation of law,
or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the
same, or by his lawful agent thereunder authorized by writing." (Italics supplied.)

At first blush this section would appear
•i be in direct conflict with Sec. 104—57—
• Apparently one section provides that a
mortgage "shall not be deemed a convey^ce, whatever its terms," while the other
Provides that a mortgage in the statutory
arm '"shall have the effect of a convey<ace of the land." However, Sec. 78—1—
\X when construed in the light of Sec.
See annotation commencing at page 777
$~-i—1. is not necessarily inconsistent of 65 A.L.R.
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[15] Prior to the trial of this case, $882
was paid into court for the benefit of defendant, as repayment of the sums advanced by him to preserve the property
This tender was refused. The court found
that the total money advanced by defendant was $875 20 for water stock assessments, general taxes, mortgage payments,
etc, and ordered that $875 20 of the money
paid into court be paid to defendant, and
the balance remitted to Om Stuart. There
was no efror in this.

3. Workmen's compensation €=>I54!
Evidence justified denial of do ith benefits to widow of employee who died as result of injury arising out of and in the
course of employment, causing lecurrenec
of old hernia which was repaired by oper
ation, on ground that death caused by in
jury did not occur within three years of
injury as required by compensation act
Utah Code 1943, 42—1—64

4. Workmen's compensation <3=>602
Workmen's Compensation Act, author
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Respondents to have their costs. lzing recovery for death of workman only
if death occurs within three years of injur)
causing
it, is unambiguous and hence not
MCDONOUGH, C. J , and PRATT,
subject
to
interpietdtion Utah Code 1943,
WADE, and LATIMER, JJ., concur.
42—1—64 «

O

I KCV NUMBER SYSTEM>

Original certiorari proceeding under
Workmen's Compensation Act by Mary F
Edwards, widow of Samuel Ldwards, de
ceased, opposed by the Industrial Commis
sion of Utah, Tintic Standard Mining Com
pany,
employer, and Continental Casualty
EDWARDS v. I N D U S T R I A L COMMISSION
Company,
insurance carrier, to review a deet al.
cision
of
the
Industrial Commission den\No. 7089.
mg claimant's application for compensation
Supreme Court of Utah,
for death of her husband and for benefits
allegedly owing to him prior to death
Feb 4, 1948.
Decision of the Industrial Commission
1. Workmen's compensation <§=>1794
When an aggrieved party has been affirmed.
granted a rehearing, receives an adverse
Willard Y Morns, of Salt Lake City,
decision thereon by Industrial Commission,
for plaintiff
and files subsequent application for further
Shirley P Tones, of Salt Lake City, and
rehearing timely, commission has jurisdiction to entertain second application and may Grover A Giles, Atty Gen , for defendants
grant or deny second application. Utah
Code 1943, 42—1—76, 42—1—77.1
PER CURIAM
On writ of certiorari, plaintiff, widow of
Samuel Edwards, seeks to have this court
determine the lawfulness of the decision of
the Industrial Commission denying her ap
plication for compensation for the death of
her husband and for benefits allegedly owing to him prior to death

2. Workmen's compensation €=1864
Aggrieved party who has been granted
a rehearing by Industrial Commission need
not file a second application for rehearing
as condition precedent to petitioning Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, when
decision on rehearing in substance is the
same as the order made on original hearing Utah Code 1943, 42—1—76, 42—1—
77

Defendants moved to quash the writ and
to dismiss the petition for writ ot cutio
ran on the giound that phintilf tailed to

1 Carter v Industrial Commission, 76
Utah 5JO, JOO P 770
2 bait Lake City v IndustnaJ Conni,

93 Utah 510, 74 P 2d 057, Hallstrom
v Industrial Cuiiim 90 Utah 85, o> P
M 7J0 distinguished
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APPENDIX VII
Pertinent Statutes
[all references are to Utah Code]
17-21-6 (duties of county recorder)
38-1-5 (priority of mechanics1 liens)
38-1-9 (notice imparted by record)
38-1-26 (assignment of lien)
57-1-6 (recording necessary to impart notice)
57-1-19 (trust deed definition)
57-1-20 (transfers in trust of realty)
57-2-1 (manner of acknowledging conveyances)
2-5 (notary shall make certificate of aknowledgment)
57-2-7 (form of certificate of acknowledgement)
-3-1 (certificate of acknowledgement to be recorded)
57-3-2 (record imparts notice)

17-21-4

COUNTIES •

17-21-4. Certified copies.
The county recorder is authorized to make and furnish to interested persons
certified photographic copies of any of the records in his office upon payment
of fees and charges provided therefor. Certified copies of such records may be
supplied to officers of the county for their official use without the payment of
any fee.
History: C.L. 1907, § 618x, added by L.
1915, ch. 87, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 1577; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 19-18-4.

17-21-5. Receipts for documents received for record.
On the filing of any instrument in writing for record in the recorder's office
the recorder shall when requested give to the person leaving the same to be
recorded a receipt therefor.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 619; C.L.
1917, § 1578; R.S. 1933 & C 1943, 19-18-5.

17-21-6. General duties — Records and indexes.
Every recorder must keep:
(1) An entry record, in which the recorder shall immediately upon receipt of any instrument to be recorded, enter in the order of its reception
or entry, as the case may be, the names of the parties thereto, its date, the
hour, the day of the month and the year of filing any such statement and
a brief description of the premises, endorsing upon each instrument a
number corresponding with the number of such entry.
(2) A grantors' index, in which shall be indexed all deeds and final
judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of
real property, which shall show the number of the instrument, the name
of each grantor in alphabetical order, the name of the grantee, date of
instrument, time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the book
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief description
of the premises.
(3) A grantees' index, in which shall be indexed all deeds and final
judgments or decrees partitioning or affecting the title to or possession of
real property, which shall show the number of the instrument, the name
of each grantee in alphabetical order, the name of the grantor, date of the
instrument, time of filing, kind of instrument, consideration, the book
and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief description
of the premises.
(4) A mortgagors' index, in which shall be entered all mortgages, deeds
of trust, liens, and all other instruments in the nature of an encumbrance
upon real estate, which shall show the number of the instrument, name of
each mortgagor, debtor or person charged with the encumbrance in alphabetical order, the name of the mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, date of instrument, time of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the book and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a
brief description of the property charged.
432
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(5) A mortgagees' index, in which shall be entered all mortgages, deeds
of trust, liens, and all other instruments in the nature of an encumbrance
upon real estate, which shall show the number of the instrument, name of
each mortgagee, lien holder, creditor or claimant, in alphabetical order,
the name of the mortgagor or person charged with the encumbrance, date
of instrument, time of filing, nature of instrument, consideration, the
book and page and entry number in which it is recorded, and a brief
description of the property charged.
(6) An abstract record, which shall show by tracts or parcels every
conveyance or encumbrance, or other instrument recorded, the date and
character of the instrument, time of filing the same, and the book and
page and entry number where the same is recorded, which record shall be
so kept as to show a true chain of title to each tract or parcel and the
encumbrances thereon as shown by the records of the office.
(7) An index to recorded maps, plats, and subdivisions.
(8) An index of powers of attorney, labeled "powers of attorney/' each
page divided into seven columns, namely: "date of filing," "book," "page,"
and "entry number," "from," "to," "revoked."
(9) A miscellaneous index, in which shall be entered all instruments of
a miscellaneous character not otherwise provided for in this section, each
page divided into eight columns, namely: "date of filing," "book," "page,"
and "entry number," "instrument," "from," "to," "remarks."
(10) An index of transcripts of judgments, labeled "transcripts of judgments," each page divided into seven columnsheaded, respectively, "judgment debtors," "judgment creditors," "amount of judgment," "where recovered," "when recovered," "when transcript filed," "when judgment satisfied."
(11) A general filing index in which shall be indexed all executions and
writs of attachment, and any other instruments not required by law to be
spread upon the records, and in separate columns he must enter the
names of the plaintiffs in the execution, the defendants in the execution,
the purchaser at the sale and the date of the sale, and the filing number of
the documents.
The indexes provided for in subdivisions (8) to (11) shall be alphabetically arranged, and in each case a reverse index shall be kept.
(12) Nothing in this section shall preclude the use of a single name
index by the recorder if such index includes and references all of the
above indexes.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 620; L.
1915, ch. 45, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 1579; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 19-18-6; L. 1955, ch. 29, § 1; 1973,
ch. 24f § 1; 1980, ch. 20, § 2; 1983, ch. 69, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1983 amendment inserted the references to parcels in Subsection (6); deleted a former Subsection (7)
which read: "An index of chattel mortgages,
labeled 'chattel mortgages,' each page divided
into seven columns, namely 'date of filing/
'book,' 'page,' 'canceled,' 'from,' 'to,' and 'remarks'"; redesignated the following subsections; substituted "8 to 11" m Subsection (11)

for "7 and 9 to 12", and deleted "The indexes
provided for in subdivisions 7 and 9 to 12 shall
be alphabetically arranged, and m each case a
reverse index shall be kept" at the end of the
section
Cross-References. — Condominium projects, duty to keep index, § 57-8-12
Federal tax hens, § 38-6-1.
Marketable record title, notice of claim of interest, § 57-9-5
Recording as imparting notice, § 57-3-2 et
seq.
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erected without knowledge and consent of
owner thereof, or mechanic's lien holders, does
not relieve building in its new location from
liability of a deficiency existing on the aale of
the land on which the building was erected to
•atisfy such liens Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah
379, 85 P. 363, 65 P. 1012 (1906).

by provisions of this section Park City Meat
Co. v. Comstock Silver Mining Co., 36 Utah
145, 103 P. 254 (1909).
Waiver, loss or forfeiture of lien.
Where there is substantial compliance with
statute creating lien, and hen has in fact been
established, lien so established cannot be defeated by technicalities nor by nice distinctions. Park City Meat Co. v. Comstock Silver
Mining Co., 36 Utah 145, 103 P. 254 U909>.

Scope and extent of lien generally.
Necessary appurtenances, including easements which extend outside of boundaries of
land upon which building is erected, is covered

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 39.
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 20.
A.L.R. — Mechanic'6 lien for work on or ma-

terial for separate buildings of one owner, 15
A.L.R.3d 73.
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens *=> 22.

38-1-5. Priority — Over other encumbrances.
The liens herein provided for shall relate back to, and take effect as oi
time of the commencement to do work or furnish materials on the ground for
the structure or improvement, and shall have priority over any lien, mortgage
or other encumbrance which may have attached subsequently to the time
when the building, improvement or structure was commenced, work begun, or
first material furnished on the ground; also over any lien, mortgage or other
encumbrance of which the lien holder had no notice and which was unrecorded at the time the building, structure or improvement was commenced,
work begun, or first material furnished on the ground.
Historv: R.S. 1898 &. C.L. 1907, §§ 1384,
1835; C.L. 1917, £§ 3734, 3735; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-5.

Cross-References. — Priority of lessors
lien, § 36 3-2.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Commencement and duration of lien.
"Commencement to do work."
Estoppel
Extent of lien.
Notice to lien holders.
Priority over other liens and claims.
Purchase money mortgage.
Question? of law and fact.
Real estate mortgage
Recordation and notice.
Relation back
Subdivision development.
Cited.
Commencement and duration of lien.
This section expressly provides that liens
shall attach at the time the performance of the
contract commences; accordingly, claimant's
lien attaches on the dale he commences the

work or furnishes the material, and 16 not postponed to the date of filing the notice for record.
Morrison v. Carey-Lombard Co., 9 Utah 7U, 33
P. 238 (1893).
Mechanic's lien takes effect as of the date of
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Park City Meat
Co., 36 Utah

ng

of lien.
compliance with
has in fact been
*d cannot be deby nice distincComstock Silver
•3 P. 254 (1909).

of one owner, 15
ics* Liens *» 22.

feci as of, the
he ground for
en, mortgage
. to the time
ork begun, or
gage or other
:h was unre- commenced,
nty of lessor's

a

nd is not post-

"°»ce for record

9 Utah 70, 33
''of the date of

commencement of work and furnishing of material, and is prior to intervening equities
Sanford v. Kunkel, 30 Utah 379, 85 P. 363, B5
P. 1012 (1906).
When labor and materials are furnished to
one not an owner, lien attaches to title instant
title vests in owner so contracting for labor and
materials furnished before he became the
owner. United States Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Midvale Home Fin Corp., 86 Utah 506. 44
P.2d 1090, rehearing denied, 86 Utah 522, 46
P.2d 672 (1935).
Whether the subsequent furnishings of materials is part of one continuous transaction, in
which case the priority date of the lien would
relate back to the first delivery date, or
whether such furnishings constitute separate
contracts, in which case there would be no relation back, is a question of fact. Boise Cascade
Corp. v. Stephens, 572 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1977).

38-1-5

350. 34 P. 368 (1893), afTd, 164 U.S. 1,17 S. Ct.
7, 4J L Ed. 327 (1896).
Lien for all of materials furnished by iingle
lien claimant on continuous, open, running account, for purpose of developing and operating
mine, held prior to trust deed executed by mining company and recorded between times when
materials are first and last furnished Fields v.
Daisy Gold Mining Co., 25 Utah 76, 69 P. 528
(1902 >, Salt Lake Hdwe. Co v. Fields, 69 P.
1134 (1902) (not officially reported)
Where vendees of land contracts on property
involved jointly assigned errors in mortgage
foreclosure action on cross-appeal, their liens
are postponed to date of last vendee's contract,
and claims of lien claimants attach as of date
when first materials are furnished and first
labor performed; and claim of lien claimants is
held superior to claim of 6uch vendees in foreclosure action. United States Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Midvale Home Fin. Corp., 86 Utah
"Commencement to do work/*
506, 44 P.2d 1090, rehearing denied. 86 Utah
The phrase "commencement to do work," as 522, 46 P.2d 672 (1935).
used in this section, is construed in favor of
Lien for labor and materials supplied purlien claimants. Calder Bros. Co. v. Anderson,
chaser of lot for building constructed thereon is
652 P.2d 922 (Utah 1982).
inferior to interest of vendor of the lot and his
successor, where it is not shown that vendor or
Estoppel
A person furnishing materials may be Es- his successor consent to. ratify, or authorize
topped by his or its acts and conduct from en- the furnishing of the materials and labor. Burjoying the priority accorded by this section. ton Walker Lumber Co. v. Howard, 92 Utah
Spargo v. Nelson* 10 Utah 274, 37 P. 495 92, 66 P.2d 134 (1937).
In determining priorities between construc(1894).
tion mortgagee and mechanic's lienors, mortExtent of ben.
gage for definite amount recorded pnor to atWhile mortgagee who advances money to tachment of any lien takes priority up to the
mortgagor to construct a building has lien amount actually paid over any mechanic's
prior to that of a subcontractor performing liens attaching subsequent to recording of
labor and furnishing materials for such build- mortgage, although loan which mortgage is ining, such lien extends only to amount actually
tended to secure is paid over to borrower as
advanced on mortgage. Culmer Paint &. Glass needed arid never advanced in full. Western
Co v. Gleason, 42 Utah 344, 130 P. 66 (1913). Mtg Loan Corp v. Cottonwood Constr Co., 18
Utah 2d 409, 424 P.2d 437 (1967).
Notice to lien holders.
This section requires other lien holders, by Purchase money mortgage.
mortgage or otherwise, to take notice of the
A mechanic's lien is superior even to a purcommencement of work on the building
chare money mortgage given at time of purTeahen v. Nelson, 6 Utah 363, 23 P. 764 chase of property in question where mortgagee,
(1890)
after materials are furnished, releases original
Survey of property did not meet the notice mortgage and takes neu. mortgage, which
standard contemplated by this section wh*re transaction, however, is not in renewal of old
the survey stakes were not sufficiently notice- mortgage, but is done to obtain increased secuable or related to actual construction to impart rity on old debt. But after satisfaction of lien,
notice to a prudent lender. Tripp v. Vaughn, mort/ra^ee is entitled to surplus Badger Coal
747 P.2d 1051 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
& Lumber Co. v. Olsen. 50 Utah 307, 167 P.
680 (1917).
Priority over other liens and claims.
Purchase money mortgage had priority over
A deed of trust upon a canal to be constructed cannot take precedence over a me- a mechanics' lien where the mechanics lien did
not attach until after the mortgage was rechanic's lien for work done and materials fur
nished in building the canal, although trust corded. Calder Bros Co. v. Anderson, 652 P.2d
deed antedates the doing of the work or fur- 922 (Utah 1982'
nishing the materials Canal is not in existence Questions of law and fact.
until constructed Garland v. Bear Lake &
In action involving prioritv between mortRiver Waterworks & Irrigation Co , 9 Utah gages and mechanic's lien, whether all mate-
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Relation back.
Mechanics' liens arising from the furnishing
of materials and labor, both on the overall 44acre site and on individual condominium units
within the development, related back to the
initial work done on the project First of
Real estate mortgage.
A mortgagee who loan^ money to a mort- Denver Mtg Investor? v CN Zundel &
gagor-borrower generalK is not only entitled Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979)
The pnoritv of all mechanic's liens arising
but obliged to pay out the money in accordance
with the direction? of the borrower, however if from a project is determined bv the date of comthe mortgagee knows that the money is being mencement of work on the project site or furborrowed for the purpose of creating improve- nishing materials on the 6ite and the release of
ments and that materials are being furnished his claims and hen* bv the hen holder who so
under such circumstances that the mortgagee commenced work or mitiallv furnished mateshould know that materialmen are relying on rials does not affect the pnoritv of other hens
being paid from 6uch funds, and if the mort- First of Denver Mtg Investors v C N Zundel
gagee knows that the mone> 16 being diverted & Assocs, 600 P2d 521 (Utah 1979)
into other purposes, then under such circumFor one contractor s hen to relate back to the
stances the mortgagee is not accorded priority commencement of work or supplving of mateas to those funds advanced after a material- rials by another contractor, both contractors'
man starts delivering building supplies. Utah projects must have been performed in connecSav & Loan Ass'n v. Mecham, 11 Utah 2d 159, tion with what is essentially a Bingle project
356 P.2d 281 (1960)
performed under a common plan prosecuted
A mortgagee may be estopped from claiming with reasonable promptness and without matea priority over a mechanic's hen, however, in rial abandonment however, ordinary mainteorder to establish an estoppel, the hen claim- nance and cleanup work does not constitute a
ant must show some concealment, misrepre- sufficient basis to permit "tacking" in order to
sentation, act, or declaration by the mortgagee fix an earlier hen date under this section for
upon which the lien holder properlv relies and
labor and materials supplied Calder Bros Co.
by which he is induced to act differently than
he would otherwise act Utah Sav & Loan v Anderson, 652 P 2d 922 (Utah 1982)
The right to have a mechanic's hen relate
Asc'n v Mecham, 12 Utah 2d 335, 366 P 2d
back
to the commencement of worV is not de598, 15 A L R 3 d 63 (1961)
feated merelv because the owners did not emplo> a general contractor but instead conRecordation and notice.
From the time the contractor begins to fur- tracted individuallv with various subcontracnish materials, it is notice to anyone thereafter tors Duckett v Olsen 699 P 2d 734 (Utah
contracting w jth the ow ner that the property is 1985)
burdened uith a hen, and no previous notice is
required and b> the tf>rm« of this section, the Subdivision development
Work of laving oui and developing subdivihen relates back to the time of furnishing the
sion including engineering installing water
material^ Can-Lombard Lumber Co v
c
main* sewer ma.n- and laterals curbs and
Sheet- 10 Utah 322 37 P 572 il8 '^
Materialmen furnishing an occupung claim- gutters surfacing street- and other off-site
ant of real estate, material for improvements construction does not gi\e rise to mechanics
theron with record notice of a prior mortgage hen attaching to particular home being conon the premises have no lien against the true structed within subdiMSion Western Mtg
owner thereof particularly where occupvmg Loan Corp v Cottonwood Con=tr Co . 18 Utah
claimant's claims to property are based upon 2d 409, 424 P 2d 437 (1967)
fraud and lack of good faith Dovle v We^t
Cited in Knight v Post 748 P 2d 1097 <Ct
Temple Terrace Co , 47 Utah 238 *152 P 1180
App 1988)
(1915)

rial* furnished during certain period are furnished under one contract or under different
contract is question of fact Gwilham Lumber
& Coal Co v El Monte Springs Corp , 87 Utah
134, 48 P.2d 463 (1935)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur 2d Mechanic*'
Liens * 263
C.J.S. — 57 C J S Mechanics' Liens § 197
A.L.R. — Mechanics hen based on contract

with vendor pena.ng executory contract for
sale of propern a« affecting purchasers interest, 50 ALR3d 944
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens ^> 198
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erty, IE properly admitted in evidence Garner
v. Van Patten, 20 Utah 342, 58 P. 684 (1899).
Where labor is performed or materials furnished upon several buildings owned by the
same person or persons, a claimant may inelude in one claim all amounts due and the
claim will not be defective if the amount due on
each separate building is not designateI. Utoh
Sev. & Loan Ass n v. Mecham. 12 Utah 2d 335,
366 P.2d 596. 15 A.L.R.3d 63 (1961).

one piece of property belonging to the lame
owner without designating the amount due on
each building or improvement, he may enforce
the lien against the owner; however, if there
ftre ot her lien claimants of the aame class, his
c l a i m i s 8UDOrdinate to their* if the claims of
t h e ,atter are agrainst onh, o n e of t h e b u i l d i n g s
^ U t a h Sav
or if t h e v c o m p H e d w i t h thlg ^
. . Q ' » . Y( \A~.U*T* I Q I W - U O ^ ^ URC
H?$f\l
A L R 3d 63 Q ^ "

If a claimant files a lien against more than
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 185.
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 134.
A.L.R. — Mechanic's lien for work on or ma-

terial for separate buildings of one owner, 15
A.L.R.3d 73.
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens •»
130(1).

38-1-9. Notice imparted by record.
(1) The recorder must record the claim in an index maintained for that
purpose.
(2) From the time the claim is filed for record, all persons are considered to
have notice of the claim.
History-: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1389;
C.L. 1917, § 3739; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-9; L. 1987, ch. 50, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1967 amendment divided this section into subsections; substituled "an index maintained for that purpose" for "a book kept by him for that purpose,
and" at the end of Subsection (1); and substi-

tuted "the claim is filed" for "of the filing
thereof and "are considered to have notice of
the claim" for "shall be deemed to have notice
thereof and made a capitalization and punctuation change in Subsection (2).
Cross-References. — Record as imparting
notice & 57-3-2

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am. Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 186.

C.J.S. —57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 131.
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' L i e n s ^ 159.

38-1-10. Laborers' and materialmen's lien on equal footing
regardless of time of filing.
The liens for work and labor done or material furnished as provided in this
chapter shall be upon an equal footing, regardless of date of filing the notice
and claim of lien and regardless of the time of performing such work and labor
or furnishing such material.
Historv: Code Report; R.S. 1933 & C.
1943, 52-1-10.
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waives, releases, and discharges any hen or
right to lien that materialman might have or
thereafter acquire against real property; such
provision does not apply to any future lien
right which materialman might acquire Such
release relates only to the particular debt paid
and receipted for in the particular transaction,
Claims of materialman for mechanics' liens for
remainder due are valid entitling it to assert
and foreclose such bens. Brimwood Homes, Inc.

v. Knudsen Bldrs. Supply Co., 14 Utah 2d 419,
385 P.2d 982 (1963)
Where claims of materialman for mechanics'
liens are valid, he is entitled to a reasonable
attorneys fee under § 36 1-18 where penaltv
provided by this section for alleged failure of
materialman to release liens is sought b>
builder who contends that the hens are invalid
Brimwood Homes, lnc v. Knudsen Bldrs Sur>ply Co., 14 Utah 2d 419, 385 P.2d 982 (1963»

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S. Mechanics' Liens § 246
Key Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens «=» 242

38-1-25. Abuse of lien right — Penalty.
Any person who knowingly causes to be filed for record a claim of lien
against any property, which contains a greater demand than the sum due
him, with the intent to cloud the title, or to exact from the owner or person
liable by means of such excessive claim of lien more than is due him, or to
procure any advantage or benefit whatever, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, $ 1399;
C.L. 1917, § 3749; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
521-25.

38-1-26. Assignment of lien.
All liens under this chapter shall be assignable as other choses in action,
and the assignee may commence and prosecute actions thereon in his own
name in the manner herein provided.
Historv: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1396;
C.L. 1917, § 3746; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
52-1-26.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to perfect lien.

assignable Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211,

Under this section, right to perfect a hen is

125 P 412. 1915C Ann Cas 1113 «1912»

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 53 Am Jur. 2d Mechanics'
Liens § 284.

C.J.S. — 57 C.J.S Mechanics' Liens * 216 et
seq
Ke> Numbers. — Mechanics' Liens t= 202
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ing to another person or persons an interest in land in which an interest is
retained by the grantor and by declaring the creation of a joint tenancy by use
of such words as herein provided In all cases the interest of joint tenants must
be equal and undivided.
History: R.S. 1898 & CL 1907, § 1973; C.L.
1917, * 4873; R.S 1933 & C. 1943, 78-1-5; L.
1953, ch. 93, ft 1.

Crosg-References. — Inheritance tax on
jointl> held propeny. § 59-12-5
Interparty agreements, I 15-3-1 et aeq

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Joint tenancies
—Alienation and execution.
—Judicial sales
—Severance by conveyance or sale.
Preference for tenancy in common.
Joint tenancies.
-.Alienation and execution.
The Supreme Court of the United States has
said that it would assume that ''Utah accepts
the general common-law rules relating to joint
tenancies, including the rules permuting
alienation of the interest of a joint tenant and
making its proper* subject io execution and
separate sale " Mangus v Miller, 317 U S 176,
63 S Ct 182, 87 L Ed . 169, rehearing denied^
317 U S 712, 63 S Ct 432, 87 L Ed 567
1*943)
—Judicial sales.
Where a joint tenant defaulted on her obhga-

of the property at a judicial sale was deemed to
£ f o r £ e £ " f l t 0 ? f *!* f * ™ " " *>lley v.
Corr
>'« 6 7 1 p - 2 d 1 3 9 ( b t a h 1 9 8 3 >
S e v e r a n c e bv conveyance or sale.
^ b
The ^
thflt a
tu
ls^
^ con
Qne ^
nce
h e s n o t o n l v to *
.
* , . ,
untary
conveyances, but also to involuntary
C n nce
° ^ ^To^°^"*?*}<£** J o I l e y
v Corr
>> 6 < ] P 2 d 1 3 9 ( L t a h 1 9 8 3 >
Preference for tenancy in common.
This section expresses the trend awa\ from
the English joint tenanc\ and in favor of tenanc\ m common Neiil \ Royce 101 Utah 181.

tion to a mortgagee, her subsequent purchase

120 P 2d 327 0941)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Cotenano
and Joint Ownership $ 27
C.J.S. — 86 C J S Tenanc> in Common * 7
A.L.R. — Severance or termination of joint

tenanc> b\ conve>ance of divided interest di«
rectiy to self 7 A L R 4th 1268
Key Numbers. — Tenancy in Common *» 3

57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation
and effect — Interest of person not named in instrument.
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county m which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs,
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have
had actual notice. Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein
386
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provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in
guch instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise
purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms
of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the interest of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or
grantors, but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was
conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest.
County recorder. § 17-21-1 et seq
Fees of recorder, § 21-2-3
Judgments, record of as imparting notice,
§ 17-21-11
Recording generally. § 57-3-1 et seq
Transmitting documents by telegraph or
telephone, § 69-1-2

History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, * 1975;
C.L. 1917, t 4875; R.S. 1933 * C. 1943,
78-1-6; L. 1945, ch. 106, i 1; 1947, ch. 97,§ 1.
Cross-Rcferences. — Acknowledgments
generally, § 57-2-1 et seq
Certified copies of record of conveyance, admission in evidence, § 78-25-13
deemed to
Jolley v
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Acknowledgments
Actual notice
—Assignments
—Dut\ to inquire.
—Execution sales
—Occupancy and possession
—Trusts
Delivery of deed
Effect of failure to record
Equitable rights
Liven of seizin
Mortgages
Patents
Priorities
Recital of consideration
Recordation as notice.
—In general
—Forged deed
"Recorded" construed
Acknowledgments.
A deed as between the parties and those having notice thereof is good without any acknowledgment, and actual possession constitutes notice Jordan v Utah R R , 47 Utah 519, 156 P
939 (1916'
A deed need not be acknowledged to be valid
between the parties thereto Mitchell v
Palmer, 121 Utah 245, 240 P 2d 970 (1952)
Acknowledgment taken by mortgagee himself as notary public is void, thus, a mortgage,
acknowledged by the mortgagee, though recorded, is ineffective for purpose of notice, since
^ ib not legallv recordable Norton v Fuller, 68
Utah 524 251 P 29(1926) See § 57-2-1 et seq

Actual notice.
—Assignments.
Attaching creditors who had actual notice of
assignment for benefit of creditors were not in
position to object that statutory notice of assignment was not given Snyder v Murdock.
20 Utah 407, 59 P 86 (1899'
—Duty to inquire.
The demands of this section are answered if
a party dealing with the land has information
of a fact or facts that would put a prudent man
upon inquiry and would, if pursued, lead to ar
tual knowledge of the state of the title, this is
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actual notice Toland v Corev, 6 Utah 392, 24
P 190 (189(0 afTd 154 U S 499. 14 S Ct
1144 38 L Ed 1062 (1894). distinguished
Shaftr \ Killpack, 53 Utah 468 173 P 948
11918'
The "actual notice" required by this aection
IF satisfied if a part\ dealing with the land had
information of facts which would put a prudent
man upon inquiry and which, if pursued, would
lead to actual knowledge as to the atate of the
title, actual notice is a question of fact John
son \ Bell, 666 P 2d 308 (Utah 1983 •
—Execution sales.
Where vendee purchased realtv from one
who had bought it at an execution sale and the
record shows the consideration given at the
sale was grosslv inadequate, the levy excessive
and no return made b> the sheriff of an> attempt to levy on personal property, the vendee
would not be justified in failing to make a reasonable inquiry into the vahditv of the sale
and if he did not make such inquiry, he would
not be a bona fide purchaser for value Pender
v Dowse, 1 Utah 2d 283, 265 P2d 644, 42
A L R 2 d 1078 (19541
—Occupancy and possession.
Even though auditor's tax deed and county
tax deed were not acknowledged title technical^ need not pass to protect a tax title claimant, and also the deed is binding as to defendant who had actual notice because of the
claimant's occupancv of the propertv Peterson
v Calhster, 6 Utah 2d 359. 313 P.2d 814
(1957), affd 8 Utah 2d 348, 334 P 2d 759
(1959)
Actual occupancy is enough to put parties
dealing with the premises upon inqum
Toland v Corev, 6 Utah 392, 24 P 190 »1S90)
aflTa 154 U S 499 14 S Ct 1144 38 L Ed
1062'lh94 distinguished Shafer \ Killpack
53 Utah 46S 173 P 94b U91S»
Under this* section actual possession and occupancv amounts to 'actual notice' to all the
world of gTantee :> rights even if his deed is not
recorded Neponset Land & Live Stock Co v
Dixon, 10 Utah 334 37 P 573 U894)
—Trusts.
Trustee under a deed of trust did not have
actual notice of plaintiffs predecessors' interest in the grazing land subject to the deed of
trust where at the time the deed of trust was
executed and recorded there were no cattle
grazing on the land no one living on the land
and no other evidence of anv activity on the
propert} which would have reasonablv alerted
the trustee to the claims of plaintiffs predeces
aors and which would have required further
investigation Johnson \. Bell, 666 P.2d 308
(Utah 1983>
Delivery of deed
Deed dulv executed and acknowledged and

fthown to be in possession of gTantee is •<
proving both as to execution and delivery, &
recording of deed is likewise evidence of del
erv Chamberlain v Larsen. 83 Utah 420
P2d 3rur) (1934)
Inference of delivery arising from possess
of deed b> grantet and from recording thei
is entitled to great and controlling weight i
can onlv bt overcome bv clear and convinc
ev idenct Chamberlain v Larsen, 83 Utah *
29 P2d 355 <19d4»
Where dulv acknowledged and recorded c
was found among papers of deceased gran
inference of delivery and execution at al
date stated in deed arose and burden was i
those claiming nondelivery to show such
Knighton v Manning 84 Utah 1. 33 P 2d
(1934.
In action b> administrator of grantor agj
executor of grantee, finding of nondehve
deed found among effects of grantee dul
knowledged and recorded three da>s
death of grantor was sustained by evid
Knighton v Manning, 84 Utah 1, 33 P 2c
(1934)
Assuming valid de^ven. ofwarrantv de
grandson of grantor, such deed would no
vail over nght to propertv existing in
person who had previouslv acquired deed
grantcr. but who had not recorded same
after deed to grandson, where it appeare'
land was in possession of occupant as
chaser from and after default as tenthira person Meacher v Dean, 97 Utal
91 P2d 454 »1939
Effect of failure to record.
Where after mortgage wa^ executed c
ta*n tract of land owner executed d<
grantee on propertv not included in moi
which deed wa«* not recorded drcref in
to foreclose mortgage on tract of land
ing part con\e\ed to grrartee. was noi b
on grantee who was not partv to such
Federal Land Bank v Pact- 87 Utah ]
P2d 480 102 A LR 819 1935•
Recordation is not a prerequisite to
liduv of a dted although unrecorded de
binding on the parties thereto Grege
Jensen, 669 P 2d 396 Utah 1953)
Equitable rights
This section itself give* no equities
applies thih section in determining e
Federal Land Bank v Pace 87 Utah 1
4* P2d 4M, 102 A L R 8191193:..
Livery of seizin.
In Utah liven of seizin t* unknown
utt ha* expres^lv abolished it, but bv
is dispensed with We IK Fargo & Co \
2 Utah 39 1)877), afTd 104 L S 428 5
802 (1681)
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ion of grantor.
•antor of property has no implied obliprotect the grantee's rights by recordrantee's interest in the property or by
j third parties of the existence of the
If the grantee fails to record, he ase risk of a subsequent grantee of the
i acquiring superior rights to his by
n. Horman v. Clark, 744 P.2d 1014
App. 1987).

CONVEYANCES
History: C. 1953, 57-1-16, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 3.
Repeais and Reenactments. — Laws 1988,
ch. 155, § 3 repeals former § 57-1-16, Utah

57-1-25

Code Annotated 1953, relating to affidavits of
lack of notice or knowledge of power of revocation, and enacts the present section, effective
July 1, 1988.

57-1-17, 57-1-18. RepealedRepeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals
§§ 57-1-17 and 57-1-18, Utah Code Annotated

1953, relating to powers of attorney, effective
July 1, 1988.

57-1-19. Trust deeds — Definitions of terms.
J Assoc, v. Wasatch BanJc, 734 P . 2 d

Effect.

S ^ o f f r ? V' Con >mercial Sec
2d 398 (Utah 1986).

«t of mortgage.
's not in itself considered
s, or personal represent!
n
"-e,th«rofth5aSttL

n e d n f o C e r r XC th Ca mU t eSde ba my e^n'loyees an w
.
''oyees,
and enacts the present
B
J
ul.v 1, 1988.
^Miit

?e or release satis-

As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36:
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his
successor in interest.
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed
as security for the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person
named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed
by trust deed, or his successor in interest.
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section
57-1-1.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust
deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1; 1988, ch.
155, § 4.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1, 1988, substituted "Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36" for "this act" in

the introductory paragraph and in Subsection
(3); substituted "trustor" for "grantor" in Subsection (3); and substituted the present provision in Subsection (5) for the former definition,
which had listed various interests in land.

57-1-25. Notice of trustee's sale — Description of property
— Time and place of sale.
NOTES TO DECISIONS

mtten demand by the
tgage after it has been
or for double the dam
:!on a^mst the mort-he: mortgage after the
mortgagee to discharge
•rthe costs of suit, and
^arge or release the

Error in notice.
—Validity of sale.
Validity of a sale was not affected by a typographical error in a notice dated October 1,
1983, which indicated that the sale would take
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place on October 28,1982, where the notice did
not confuse bidders or result in an undervaluation of the property. Concepts, Inc. v. First Sec.
Realty Servs., Inc., 743 P.2d 1158 (Utah 1987).
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reports.
"missing in
titute or be
the death of
it operate to

57-1-21

(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed
by trust deed, or his successor in interest.
(5) "Real property" means any estate or interest in land, including all
buildings, fixtures and improvements thereon and all water rights, rights
of way, easements, rents, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, used or enjoyed with said land, or any part thereof.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust
deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 1.
Meaning of "this act". — The phrase "this
act" appearing in the introductory language

and subdivision (3) apparently refers to L.
1961, ch. 181 which enacted this section and
§§ 57-1-20 to 57-1-36.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d.
§ 15 et seq.

55 Am. Jur. 2d Mortgages

C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 5.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages e» 1.

57-1-20. Transfers in trust of real property — Purposes —
Effect

visions in
provision for

Transfers in trust of real property may be made to secure the performance
of an obligation of the trustor or any other person named in the trust deed to a
beneficiary. All right, title, interest and claim in and to the trust property
acquired by the trustor, or his successors in interest, subsequent to the execution of the trust deed, shall inure to the trustee as security for the obligation
or obligations for which the trust property is conveyed in like manner as if
acquired before execution of the trust deed.

y.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 2.
ig of this section
ch enacted this
1-17.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 6.
Key Numbers. — Mortgages <s=> 1.

57-1-21. Trustees of trust deeds — Qualifications.

3signated in a
given, or his
y a trust deed
;h this act and
performance of
ed to a benefi-

(1) The trustee of a trust deed shall be:
(a) any member of the Utah State Bar;
(b) any bank, building and loan association, savings and loan association, or insurance company authorized to do business in Utah under the
laws of Utah or the United States;
(c) any corporation authorized to conduct a trust business in Utah under the laws of Utah or the United States;
(d) any title insurance or abstract company authorized to do business
in Utah under the laws of Utah;
(e) any agency of the United States government; or
(f) any association or corporation which is licensed, chartered, or regulated by the Farm Credit Administration or its successor.
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CHAPTER 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Section
57-2-1.
57-2-2.
57-2-3.
57-2-4.
57-2-5.
57-2-6.
57-2-7.
57-2-8.
57-2-9.

Manner of acknowledging or proving
conveyances
Who authorized to take acknowledgments.
Acknowledgment by deputy.
Taking acknowledgments of persons
with United States armed
forces.
Certificate of acknowledgment.
Party must be known or identified.
Form of certificate of acknowledgment.
When grantor unknown to officer.
When executed by attorney m fact.

Section
57-2-10. Proof of execution—How made.
57-2-11. Witness must be known or identi
fied.
57-2-12. Certificate of proof by subscribing
witness.
57-2-13. Form of certificate of proof.
57-2-14. When subscribing witness deadProof of handwriting.
57-2-15. What evidence required for certificate of proof.
57-2-16, Subpoena to subscribing witness.
57-2-17. Disobedience of subpoenaed witness—Contempt—Proof
aliunde.

57-2-1. Manner of acknowledging or proving conveyances.
Every conveyance in writing whereby any real estate is conveyed or may be
affected shall be acknowledged or proved and certified in the manner hereinafter provided.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1984;
C.L. 1917, § 4884; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-2-1.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Deed
Either the acknowledgment or the proving
must accompany every deed to make it valid.
Both are not necessary to make it prima facie

good, either being sufficient if the deed is otherwise sufficient. Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5
Utah 205, 14 P 338 (1887), affd, 142 U.S. 241,
12 S.Ct. 158, 35 L. Ed. 999 (1891).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. -1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledgments § 5.

C.J.S. — 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments S§ 6, 7.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «=» 3, 4.

57-2-2. Who authorized to take acknowledgments.
The proof or acknowledgment of every conveyance whereby any real estate
is conveyed or may be affected shall be taken by some one of the following
officers:
(1) If acknowledged or proved within this state, by a judge or clerk of a
court having a seal, or a notary public, county clerk or county recorder.
(2) If acknowledged or proved without this state and within any state
or territory of the United States, by a judge or clerk of any court of the
United States, or of any state or territory, having a seal, or by a notary
414
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(2) When made by any other officer, under the hand and official seal of
such officer.
story: R.S. 1898 & C.L 1907, § 1987;
1917, § 4887; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
.4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
orities
.
>ate of certificate.
)ate of certificate of acknowledgment is not

always determinative of priorities between
mortgages State v. Johnson, 71 Utah 572, 268
p ggj (1928)

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
\m. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am Jur 2d Acknowledg»nts § 32 et seq.

C.J.S. — 1A C.J S Acknowledgments § 67.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «» 33.

7-2-6. Party must be known or identified.
No acknowledgment of any conveyance whereby any real estate is conveyed
r may be affected shall be taken unless the person offering to make such
cknowledgment shall be personally known to the officer taking the same to
e the person whose name is subscribed to such conveyance as a party thereto,
r shall be proved to be such by the oath or affirmation of a credible witness
>ersonally known to the officer taking the acknowledgment.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1988;
:.L. 1917, § 4888; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-2-5.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 1A C J S Acknowledgments § 52
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment <s=» 22.

57-2-7. Form of certificate of acknowledgment.
A certificate of acknowledgment to any instrument in writing affecting the
title to any real property in this state may be substantially in the following
form:
State of Utah, County of
On the
day of
, 19
, personally appeared before
me
, the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
The certificate of acknowledgment of an instrument executed by a corporation must be substantially in the following form:
State of Utah, County of
On the
day of
, 19
, personally appeared before
me
, who being by me duly sworn (or affirmed), did say that he
—„;A<m+ (nr other officer or agent, as the case may be) of (naming
_ _ : ^ ^ ^ hphalf of said

Oi-A-H

I\Ejf\U

L O i n i D

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledgments § 14.

C.J.S. — 1A Acknowledgments § 36.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment e=> 16.

57-2-4. Taking acknowledgments of persons with United
States armed forces.
In addition to the acknowledgment of instruments in the manner and form
and as otherwise authorized by this chapter, any person serving in or with the
armed forces of the United States may acknowledge the same wherever located before any commissioned officer in the active service of the armed forces
of the United States with the rank of second lieutenant or higher in the Army
or Marine Corps, or ensign or higher in the Navy or United States Coast
Guard. The instrument shall not be rendered invalid by the failure to state
therein the place of execution or acknowledgment. No authentication of the
officer's certificate of acknowledgment shall be required, but the officer taking
the acknowledgment shall endorse thereon or attach thereto a certificate substantially in the following form:
On this
day of
,
19
, before me
, the
undersigned officer, personally appeared
, known
to me (or satisfactorily proven) to be serving in or with the armed forces oi
the United States and to be the person whose name is subscribed to the
within instrument and acknowledged that
executed the same for the purposes therein contained. And the undersigned
does further certify that he is at the date of this certificate a commissioned officer of the rank stated below and is in the active service of the
armed forces of the United States.
Signature of Officer
Rank of Officer and Command to Which Attachec
History: C. 1943, 78-2-3.10, enacted by L.
1943, ch. 83, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 33.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment <s=* 16.

57-2-5. Certificate of acknowledgment.
Every officer who shall take the proof or acknowledgment of any conveyance affecting any real estate shall make a certificate thereof, and cause such
certificate to be endorsed on or annexed to such conveyance. Such certificate
shall be:
(1) When made by any judge or clerk, under the hand of such judge or
clerk, and the seal of the court.

57-2-8
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corporation by authority of its bylaws (or of a resolution of its board of
directors, as the case may be), and said
acknowledged to me
that said corporation executed the same.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1989;
C.L. 1917, § 4889; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-2-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Effect of certificate.
—Evidence of facts therein.
Verification of mechanic's lien notice.
Effect of certificate.
- E v i d e n c e of facts therein.
The certificate of acknowledgment is itself
only prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. It is not conclusive, and may be rebutted. Tarpey v. Desert Salt Co., 5 Utah 205, 14
P. 338 (1887), affd, 142 U.S. 241, 12 S. Ct. 158,
35 L, Ed. 999 (1891).

Verification of mechanic's lien notice.
T h e u s e o f a cor
Porate acknowledgment
mstead
of a sworn statement that the contents
of t h e
mechanic's lien notice were true did not
satisfy the requirement of § 38-1-7 that such
notice must be verified. First Sec. Mtg. Co. v.
Hansen, 631 P.2d 919 (Utah 1981).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 1 Am. Jur. 2d Acknowledgments § 34.

C.J.S. — 1A C.J.S. Acknowledgments § 61.
Key Numbers. — Acknowledgment «=> 29.

57-2-8. When grantor unknown to officer.
When the grantor is unknown to the officer taking the acknowledgment,
the certificate shall be substantially in the following form, to wit:
State of Utah, County
On this
day of
, 19
, personally appeared before
me
, satisfactorily proved to me to be the signer of the above
instrument by the oath of
, a competent and credible witness
for that purpose, by my duly sworn, and he, the said
acknowledged that he executed the same.
Such certificate when properly executed by an officer authorized to take
acknowledgments to instruments in writing affecting the title to real property
in this state, and attached to a conveyance in writing, shall be a sufficient
acknowledgment and certificate that such conveyance was executed as required by law.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1990;
C.L. 1917, § 4890; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-2-7.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 203.
Key Numbers. — Deeds <s=* 207.

tired by law to
ified under the
esiding in the
sstify touching
ed without his
r proof of such
appear before

CHAPTER 3
RECORDING CONVEYANCES
Section
57-3-1.
57-3-2.

57-3-3.
57-3-4.
57-3-5.

Certificate of acknowledgment or of
proof of execution a prerequisite.
Record imparts notice — Recordation not affected by change in
interest rate.
Effect of failure to record.
Certified copies entitled to record in
another county—Effect.
Mortgages—Assignment of—Effect
of recordation.

Section
57-3-6, 57-3-7. Repealed.
57-3-8. Failure to discharge mortgage after
satisfaction—Liability.
57-3-9. Conveyances prior to January 1,
1898—Recording—Effect.
57-3-10. Legal description of real property
and names and addresses required in instruments.
57-3-11. Original documents required — Captions — Legibility.

57-3-1. Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of execution a prerequisite.
less—ConLit reasonable
answer upon
:y injured for
:h neglect or
y law; but no
in which the
ive first been
action to the
scribing withe cannot be
iue diligence
for the space
Drocess, then
1 tgf record in
dead.
>mpt, § 78-32-1

A certificate of the acknowledgment of any conveyance, or of the proof of the
execution thereof as provided in this title, signed and certified by the officer
taking the same as provided in this title, shall entitle such conveyance, with
the certificate or certificates aforesaid, to be recorded in the office of the
recorder of the county in which the real estate is situated.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999;
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-1.
Cross-References. — Documents sent by

telegraph or telephone may be recorded,
§ 69-1-2.
Model Marketable Titles § 57-9-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Acknowledgment by mortgagee.
Disqualification of office taking acknowledgment.
Acknowledgment by mortgagee.
An acknowledgment taken by mortgagee
himself as a notary public is void, and renders
mortgage unrecordable. Norton v. Fuller, 68
Utah 524, 251 P. 29 (1926).

Disqualification of office taking acknowledgment.
If acknowledgment is taken before officer
disqualified to act, certificate is ineffectual.
Crompton v. Jenson, 78 Utah 55, 1 P.2d 242
(1931).
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uurucu — assignment ui a ueneiiciai interest.
Any trust deed, substitution of trustee, assignment of a beneficial interest
under a trust deed, notice of default, trustee's deed, reconveyance of the trust
property, and any instrument by which any trust deed is subordinated or
waived as to priority, if acknowledged as provided by law, is entitled to be
recorded. The recording of an assignment of a beneficial interest in the trust
deed does not in itself impart notice of the assignment to the trustor, his heirs
or personal representatives, so as to invalidate any payment made by any of
them to the person holding the note, bond, or other instrument evidencing the
obligation by the trust deed.
History: L. 1961, ch. 181, § 18; 1988, ch.
155, § 5.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988, deleted "and shall,
from the time of filing the same with the re-

corder for record, impart notice of the contents
thereof to all persons, including subsequent
purchasers and encumbrancers for value, except that the" at the end of the first sentence
and made minor stylistic changes.

CHAPTER 2
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Section
57-2-1 to 57-2-9. Repealed.

57-2-1 to 57-2-9. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1988, ch. 155, § 24 repeals
§ 57-2-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, § 57-2-2,
as amended by Laws 1987, ch. 53, § 1, and
§§ 57-2-3 to 57-2-9, Utah Code Annotated

1953, relating to acknowledgments, effective
July 1, 1988. For present comparable provisions, see §§ 57-2a-l to 57-2a-7.

CHAPTER 2a
RECOGNITION OF
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Section
57-2a-l. Title.
57-2a-2. Definitions.
57-2a-3. Persons authorized to perform notarial acts under laws of other jurisdictions.

Section
57-2a-4. Proof of authority — Prima facie evidence.
57-2a-5. Certificate.
57-2a-6. Form of certificate.
57-2a-7. Form of acknowledgment.
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History: C. 1953, 57-2a-l, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 6.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988

57-2a-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Acknowledged before me" means:
(a) that the person acknowledging appeared before the person taking the acknowledgment;
(b) that he acknowledged he executed the document;
(c) that, in the case of:
(i) a natural person, he executed the document for the purposes stated in it;
(ii) a corporation, the officer or agent acknowledged he held
the position or title set forth in the document or certificate, he
signed the document on behalf of the corporation by proper authority, and the document was the act of the corporation for the
purpose stated in it;
(iii) a partnership, the partner or agent acknowledged he
signed the document on behalf of the partnership by proper authority, and he executed the document as the act of the partnership for the purposes stated in it;
(iv) a person acknowledging as principal by an attorney in
fact, he executed the document by proper authority as the act of
the principal for the purposes stated in it; or
(v) a person acknowledging as a public officer, trustee, administrator, guardian, or other representative, he signed the document by proper authority, and he executed the document in the
capacity and for the purposes stated in it; and
(d) that the person taking the acknowledgment:
(i) either knew or had satisfactory evidence that the person
acknowledging was the person named in the document or certificate; and
(ii) in the case of a person executing a document in a representative capacity, either had satisfactory evidence or received the
sworn statement or affirmation of the person acknowledging that
the person had the proper authority to execute the document.
(2) "Notarial act" means any act a notary public is authorized by state
law to perform, including administering oaths and affirmations, taking
acknowledgments of documents, and attesting documents.
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-2, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 7.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988
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57-2a-3. Persons authorized to perform notarial acts under laws of other jurisdictions.
The following persons authorized under the laws and regulations of other
governments may perform notarial acts outside this state for use in this state
with the same effect as if performed by a notary public of this state:
(1) a notary public authorized to perform notarial acts in the place
where the act is performed;
(2) a judge, clerk, or deputy clerk of any court of record in the place
where the notarial act is performed;
(3) an officer of the foreign service of the United States, a consular
agent, or any other person authorized by regulation of the United States
Department of State to perform notarial acts in the place where the act is
performed;
(4) a commissioned officer in active service with the Armed Forces of
the United States and any other person authorized by regulation of the
Armed Forces to perform notarial acts if the notarial act is performed for
any of his dependents, a merchant seaman of the United States, a member of the Armed Forces of the United States, or any other person serving
with or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States; or
(5) any other person authorized to perform notarial acts in the place
where the act is performed.
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-3, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 8.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

57-2a-4L Proof of authority — Prima facie evidence,
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) and (3), the signature, title or
rank, branch of service, and serial number, if any, of any person described in
Subsections 57-2a-3(l) through (5) are sufficient proof of his authority to perform a notarial act. Further proof of his authority is not required.
(2) Proof of the authority of a person to perform a notarial act under the
laws or regulations of a foreign country is sufficient if:
(a) a foreign service officer of the United States resident in the country
in which the act is performed or a diplomatic or consular officer of the
foreign country resident in the United States certifies that a person holding that office is authorized to perform the act;
(b) the official seal of the person performing the notarial act is affixed
to the document; or
(c) the title and indication of authority to perform notarial acts of the
person appears either in a digest of foreign law or in a list customarily
used as a source of such information.
(3) The signature and title or rank of the person performing the notarial act
are prima facie evidence that he is a person with the designated title and that
his signature is genuine.
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-4, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 9.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

is of other
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A person taking an acknowledgment shall cause a certificate in a form
acceptable under Section 57-2a-6 or 57-2a-7 to be endorsed on or attached to
the document or other written instrument.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

History: C. 1953, 57-2a-5, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 10.
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57-2a-6. Form of certificate.
The form of a certificate of acknowledgment used by a person whose authority is recognized under Section 57-2a-3 shall be accepted if:
(1) the certificate is in a form prescribed by the laws or rules of this
state;
(2) the certificate is in a form prescribed by the laws or regulations
applicable in the place where the acknowledgment is taken; or
(3) the certificate contains the words "acknowledged before me," or
their substantial equivalent.
History: C. 1953, 57-2a-6, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 11.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

57-2a-7. Form of acknowledgment.
The form of acknowledgment set forth in this section, if properly completed,
is sufficient under any law of this state. It is known as "Statutory Short Form
of Acknowledgment." This section does not preclude the use of other forms.
State of
)
) ss.
County of
-)
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this (date) by (person acknowledging, title or rank, and representative capacity, if any).
(Seal)
My commission expires:

(Signature of Person Taking Acknowledgment)
(Title or Rank, Branch of Service, and
Serial Number, if applicable)
Residing at:

History: C. 1953, 57-2a-7, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 155, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1988, ch. 155,
§ 25 makes the act effective on July 1, 1988.

it
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CHAPTER 3
RECORDING OF DOCUMENTS
Section
57-3-1.
57-3-2.

Section
57-3-3.
57-3-4.

Certificate of acknowledgment or of
proof of execution a prerequisite.
Record imparts notice — Recordation not affected by change in interest rate — Validity of document
not affected — Third person not
charged with notice of unnamed
interests — Conveyance free and
clear of unrecorded interests.

Effect of failure to record.
Certified copies entitled to record in
another county — Effect.
57-3-10. Legal description of real property
and names and addresses required
in documents,
57-3-11. Original documents required — Captions — Legibility,

57-3-L Certificate of acknowledgment or of proof of execution a prerequisite,
A certificate of the acknowledgment of any document, or of the proof of the
execution of any document that is signed and certified by the officer taking
the acknowledgment as provided in this title, entitles the document and the
certificate to be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county where the
real property is located.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1999;
C.L. 1917, § 4899; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-1; 1988, ch. 155, § 13.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-

ment, effective July 1,1988, substituted "document" for "conveyance" throughout the section
and made stylistic changes.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Law Reviews. — Recent Developments in
Utah Law, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 95, 123.

57-3-2. Record imparts notice — Recordation not affected
by change in interest rate — Validity of document not affected — Third person not charged
with notice of unnamed interests — Conveyance
free and clear of unrecorded interests.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title; each original document or certified copy of a document
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged; and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged; shall, from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the
document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the
document
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third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any
other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he
appears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this
title that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest.
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2000;
C.L. 1917, § 4900; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-2; L. 1977, ch. 272, § 54; 1985, ch. 159,
§ 7; 1988, ch. 155, § 14,
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend-
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ment, effective July 1,1988, added Subsections
(3) to (5) and rewrote Subsections (1) and (2), as
last amended by Laws 1985, ch. 159, § 7, to
such an extent that a detailed comparison is
impracticable.

ANALYSIS

Effect of failure to record.
Mortgages.
Recordation as notice.
—Time from which notice imparted.
Effect of failure to record.
Where a prior deed was not recorded until
three years after the purchasers* assignments
of their equitable interests in the property
were executed and recorded, the assignee had
no constructive notice of the deed, and the assignee's lien was therefore superior to a bank's
subsequent trust deed received from the purchasers. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v.
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987).

this section. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assoc, v.
Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d 904 (Utah 1987).
Recordation as notice.
—Time from which notice imparted.
The date of recording, not the date of execution, governs the time from which an instrument imparts notice to all persons. Utah Farm
Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Wasatch Bank, 734 P.2d
904 (Utah 1986).

Mortgages.
Mortgages are subject to the provisions of

57-3-3- Effect of failure to record.
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Each document not recorded as provided in this title is void as against any
subsequent purchaser of the same real property, or any portion of it, if:
(1) the subsequent purchaser purchased the property in good faith and
for a valuable consideration; and
(2) the subsequent purchaser's conveyance is first duly recorded.
History: R S . 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2001;
C.L. 1917, § 4901; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943,
78-3-3; 1988, ch. 155, § 15.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective July 1,1988, substituted "docu-

ment" for "conveyance of real estate" in the
introductory paragraph; added Subsections (1)
and (2), deleting comparable provisions from
the introductory paragraph; and made minor
stylistic changes.
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